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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: An Application of Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System to Identify Organizational Factors in Maritime Accidents.
Degree:

MSc

In maritime history, the shipping maintains a fairly good safety record generally, but
still with a number of major maritime accidents occasionally. Maritime accident
investigation as the main means to improve the maritime safety is widely used in
maritime practice. The need of a well–structured and –classified accident causation
model for directing maritime accident investigation is dictated by growing social
pressure for the further improvement on the safety record of shipping and the major
reform of understanding of human error, a focus on the organizational factors.
The purpose of this paper is to adapt a proper accident causation model with
reference to identification of organizational factors in maritime accidents. In
connection with the organizational factors in the ISM Code, the desired causation
model is adapted on the basis of the renowned Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System (HFACS). By applying the targeted model into two specific
maritime cases, observations are made as follows: it is positive to apply the adapted
model in specific maritime cases in terms of directing the collection of accident data
and sufficient and reliable analysis of the accident. The same principle of the adapted
HFACS framework can be also applied by the shipping industry for the purpose of
reviewing and benchmarking shipping safety performance. The significance of
organizational factors in safety performance is discussed as well. In the end, proper
recommendations in relation to how to apply such an adapted framework in maritime
practice based on the remarks above are made.
KEYWORDS: Organizational Factors, Causation Model, Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System (HFACS), the International Safety Management Code.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background
It is widely acknowledged that the shipping industry carries 90% of the globe trade.
In particular since the 1970’s, the amount of goods actually carried by ships has
increased dramatically and reaching 8.02 billion tons of goods loaded in 2007 (IMO,
2009). Strong demand for maritime transport services fuelled by growth in the
world’s economy and international merchandise trade is still continuing.
Thanks to the constant endeavours of the rapid development of technology in ship
design and navigation aids, the shipping industry still maintains a fairly good safety
record, nevertheless, there are a number of challenges for maritime safety (See
Figure 1) (Hetherington, Flin & Mearns, 2006). Major maritime disasters
occasionally take place around the world, such as the Titanic disaster in 1912, the
TORREY CANYON in 1967 and the ESTONIA in 1994. Perrow (1999) refers to these
events as “the normal accidents” with the view that multiple and unexpected
interactions of failures are inevitable. The enormous loss of life and property, as well
as the environmental damage, involved in shipping casualties, demonstrated the need
of constant improvement in maritime safety.
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Figure 1 Serious and total loss from 1994 to 2009 by number (Ships over 500 GT)
Source: International Union of Marine Insurance, 2010.

There are numerous diverse approaches to be applied to improve safety performance
on board. Accident investigations, as required by the Casualty Investigation Code
(IMO, 2008a) and implemented by the majority of states (such as the United
Kingdom by the Merchant Shipping Act 1995), is one of several widely utilized
approaches

to

achieve

safety

(Harms-Ringdahl,

2004).

According

to

Harms-Ringdahl’s argument, accident investigation is the “collection and
examination of facts related to an occurred specific event”. By this definition, we
clearly see the purpose of accident investigation is to diagnose what occurs in the
system. Even more meaningfully and pragmatically is that the lessons learned from
accident investigation should be conducive to prevention of reoccurrence, as stated in
the Casualty Investigation Code (IMO, 2008a). Along with this useful and positive
function, most major improvements or modifications to a maritime legislative system,
criticized as the “disaster-driven system”, are often carried out after lessons learned
from major accidents (Jalonen & Salmi, 2009). In addition, from the risk assessment
point of view, the analysis of an accident plays an indispensable role for setting
priorities and identifying hazardous sources (Swedish Rescue Services Agency,
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2000). Albeit its passive pattern, the lessons learned from accident investigation
contribute a lot to the safety record of the maritime industry. However, most of the
current maritime accident investigation systems encourage investigators to determine
what happened during an event and how the event occurred, rather than question why
the event occurred (ABS Consuliting, 2005). This negative aspect of the current
system discourages investigators to search for underlying factors behind the accident
(Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009). To shun this negative influence, a better
understanding and workable analysis causation model to direct accident investigation
methodology is an alternative need.
On the other hand, in order to better understand the concept of “human error” or
“human factor” and the accident, the need for an appropriate accident causation
model becomes clear. It is generally recognized that human error is attributed to the
majority of maritime accidents (Harrald et al, 1998; Trucco, Cagno, Ruggeri &
Grande, 2008). Each year in the maritime industry, financial loss caused by human
error is far more than 400 million pounds in the forms of ones’ loss business, jobs
and ruining reputation, or even spending the rest of life in prison (UK P&I Club,
2003).It is easy to off-hand attribute the accident occurrence to the human error or
human factor. However, the terms “human error” and “human factor” are often
exchanged in the safety industry but without distinguishing the meanings of these
labels. Even to the professional accident investigators among transportation
administrations, there is no such thing as a professional usage of the human factor
but a spectrum of meanings (Korolija & Lundberg, 2010). The negative way people
understanding human error or the human factor always pushes them merely to assign
the liability of the accident to the “bad apple” (Dekker, 2002, 2006) in hindsight.
Often, investigators also tend to identify the person who seems to be the most
responsible for the accident, but leave the root cause hidden. This phenomenon often
takes place in maritime industry (UK P&I Club, 2003), where large numbers of
examples can be found in maritime history, such as the PRESTIGE pollution incident
in 2002 and HEBEI SPIRIT disaster in 2007 where both captains were blamed for
their so-called negligence even though they had made reasonable efforts to prevent
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the accidents. However, from the perspective of the preventive measures, a change of
human behaviour through selection of better personnel, will be of little avail and no
well-controlled study convincingly shows that a decrease of accident rate can be
achieved by general safety-training or motivation programs (Wagenaar &
Groeneweg, 1987, p.587) .
In fact, the concept of human error in industrial environments and transportation
systems appears to be far more sophisticated to interpret than simply blaming the
operator (Reinach & Viale, 2006). Recently, however, the increasing research
(Brown & Haugene, 1998; Gordon, 1997; Kongsvik, Almklov & Fenstad, 2010;
Reason, 1990, 1997; Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009; Wagenaar & Groeneweg,
1987) has intimated that in consideration of human error, organizational factors are
in need to be specially taken account of. Time has come to accept these methods that
control safety performance other than by simply telling frontline operators not to do
stupidly. For instance, the high-value “Swiss cheese” model created by Reason (1990;
1997; 2008) in better comprehending the accident, divides the failures in
organizational accidents (in sharp contrast to individual accidents) into two groups:
active failures at the sharp end and latent failures at blunt end. Woods, Johannesen,
Cook and Sarter (1994) further defined the relative connection between sharp end
and blunt end that failures made at the sharp end are determined by those at blunt end.
Reason’s model (1990; 1997; 2008) has been highly appreciated by a large number
of researchers. One of them is Barnett (2005) who noted that the contributions of
such a model make the determination of a single cause for any accident virtually
impossible, despite the shortage of practical application (Wiegmann & Shappell,
2001). In maritime industrial practice, the United Kingdom’s Maritime
Administration (IMO, 2004) has highlighted a group of findings from a number of
accidents associated with the deficiencies of the ISM Code, which primarily deals
with standardizing the organizational control in the safety field. We have learned
from this research, e.g. Brown & Haugene’s work (1998), that organizational factors
are essential for accident analysis in accident investigations, particularly in the
maritime industry where the ISM Code needs to be considered.
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In our routine practice of maritime accident investigations, a proper accident
causation model is needed in order to fully consider all the possible factors which
may influence system failures. This causation model will not only help investigators
to conceptualize human error in an appropriate manner, but also direct data collection
and accident analysis. In addition, the elements of the ISM Code are highly directive
to those factors influential on safety performance. What are the roles of the
organizational factors in the context of maritime safety? What is a proper accident
causation model incorporating the elements of ISM Code? Is such an adapted
accident causation framework applicable in specific maritime cases? In response to
the above questions, this paper has been developed by combining the proper
academic theories and their empirical applications.

1.2 Objectives of the study
This study attempts to achieve the following objectives:
1. Describe the organizational functions of the ISM Code;
2. Discuss the feasibility of establishment of the connection between the selected
causation model and ISM Code;
3. Adapt a proper accident causation model incorporating the elements of the ISM
Code;
4. Test the applicability of adapted accident causation model into two specific
cases;
5. Discuss the role of organizational factors in the context of maritime safety;
6. Discuss the verification of the adapted causation model;
7. Make some recommendations on how to apply the adapted causation model.

5

1.3 Methodology
In order to achieve the above described tasks in the given time period, the selection
of proper methodology is necessary. The commonly used research methodologies
can be generally be divided into two groups, namely quantitative methodology and
qualitative methodology, each having its pros and cons. In contrast to the qualitative
methodology, the quantitative methodology is often preferred by decision makers in
practices due to its easy of application and readiness in terms of figures and graphs.
Challenging in applying the qualitative methodology into practice, e.g. the lack of
sufficient theoretical foundation, increases the difficulties in application of the
qualitative methodology.
Despite these difficulties, the qualitative methodology has been decided to be the
prior option for this research due to the fact that some sensitive accident reports or
details are unlikely to be exposed to public scrutiny. The lack of sufficient accident
reports may impair the accuracy of this research or even make this study void. In
addition, the construction of mathematical models for the quantitative approach is a
demanding and time-consuming job which may not be practically completed within a
couple of months.
Given the introduction of the background, human error, as the predominant cause of
marine casualties, it should be interpreted as the factors not only related to the
operator’s error at the proximal end, but also associated with the organizational
factors at the remote end. All the possible factors in relation to the event failure
should be taken into account in the causation model below.
In searching the required accident report, two criteria for determination are in need of
consideration. Firstly, the investigation should be completed and the accident
information should be released as reasonably as it should be. Secondly, one is
suggested to be more sophisticated than the other. Hence, two accident reports have
been selected randomly under the two criteria aforementioned. The first case locks
on to the historic disaster of the foundering of the vessel Estonia, leading to 852
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deaths and the sinking of the vessel, mainly relating to human error apart from some
technical failures exposed. The application attempts to shun any new source of
evidence aside from the facts revealed by the official report. This paper tries to
provide the comparison of different approaches on their applications, as well as the
same in the second case regarding the QINGFENG 128 flying Chinese flag which
collided with a constructing bridge, an accident that led to 4 deaths.
During the period of searching for the literature material to establishing the essential
theoretical basis, the author was heavily shocked by two phenomena: firstly, the few
sources of maritime studies on theoretical development associated with maritime
safety issues in comparison to other industries; in particular most articles on
maritime issues have been written decades ago. Even in response to the compulsory
report to IMO, the database in GISIS proved conclusively to be insufficient,
specifically that inadequate relevant details were released in the submitted reports
(IMO, 2010). It seems that the maritime industry lacks motivation to do academic
research on this issue. This may be one of the reasons why the theoretical
development has often lagged behind other transport sectors, especially the aviation
field. Secondly, as for the accident reports, the sensitive/shamefulness makes the
authorities unwilling to fully open the information to the public. The Academic
researchers often complain about the lack of any complete and structured accident
database, which heavily impedes the development speed of a safety theory in the
maritime industry. In contrast, most of the aviation reports have been published with
more details and less hidden information. This is one reason why more and deeper
research is carried out in aviation safety rather than maritime safety.
In spite of these negative issues, the author has still managed to make more
endeavours to reach a valuable and workable result for the maritime industry.

1.4 Limitations of the study
Not only the learning from an extensive range of literature reviews, but also the
author’s empirical opinion gained from a decade of work and study involved in
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profession of maritime accident investigation in administration is applied to this
study. The accuracy of this study is constrained by the extent of how vast and deep
the literature review is and how far the author will conclude experience from
practice.
Furthermore, the limited quantity of case studies also reflects the constraints of this
study. In order to further validate the findings from this paper, further studies need to
be considered.

1.5 Plan of the study
This dissertation is mainly divided into six main chapters. The first chapter begins
with a preliminary explanatory background of the topic giving the motivation for and
methodology of this research. The prevailing ISM Code dealing with organizational
control in terms of safety performance is discussed in Chapter Two, followed ´by the
identification of organizational factors in the ISM Code in connection with the
causation model. After that, the selection of a proper causation model is determined
on the basis of certain given principles. In consideration of the practical situations of
maritime accident investigation and organizational factors in the ISM Code, the
selected causation model is adapted so as to apply it in practice. Chapter Three
contains two case studies, representing a complicated and a simple case. These case
studies start with a summary of the official report, facts and analyses, then gives the
re-analysis of cases by the new framework perspective. Some findings in short are
observed from the applications described at the end of each case study followed by
the subsequent discussion. Chapter Four discusses the findings in terms of roles of
organizational factors. In Chapter Five, the verification of the new developed
framework is discussed. Last but not least, the concluding parts are placed in Chapter
Six, followed by some recommendations on how to apply the new model in practice
as perceived through the applications.
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Chapter 2 ISM Code and HFACS model

In order to verify an accident causation model in specific cases and assess the role of
organizational factors in the maritime context by employment of such a model,
proper theoretical foundation and an appropriate accident causation model need to be
established and determined with reference to the organizational factors. The
International Safety Management (ISM) Code (IMO, 2002) which aims at enhancing
the safety performance on board by consolidation of organizational functions, is
described and reviewed in this chapter, as well as the identification of the
organizational factors in the ISM Code. Then, its connection in terms of the
organizational factors with the targeted model is established. In addition, a proper
accident causation model is selected, adapted and adopted in consideration of its aim
to address the significance of the organizational factors in the maritime context.

2.1 The International Safety Management Code
The lessons learned from serious accidents during the 1980s, such as the HERALD
OF FREE ENTERPRISE, pointed out the importance of organizational factors and
that impact on accident casualties. In particular poor management plays a central role
in these accidents (Whittingham, 2004, p.120; IMO, 2005). To meet the needs of
addressing overall organizational functions, the ISM Code was adopted in 1993 by
IMO Resolution A.741(18) (IMO, 2005). In sharp contrast to much other maritime
legislation, the ISM Code specifically focuses on the management of people and
processed in the maritime industry, perhaps for the first time.
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The implementation and enforcement of the ISM Code resulted in a dramatic
improvement in safety and environmental performance of the industry (Figure 2),
impressively with growth in the volume of the world fleet by almost 50%. (ICS &
ISF, 2010). This appealing result was supported by an assessment to the impact of
the ISM Code on the safety of ships by IMO three years after implementing on the
remaining world fleet (IMO, 2005). As a specific case, the assessment of the
effectiveness of the implemented ISM Code in the Greek fleet further justified its
positive control on organizational factors in the shipping industry by analyzing the
factors related to human error by scrutinizing all accidents over the pre- and
post-ISM period (Tzannatos & Kokotos, 2009).

Figure 2 Reduction of Total Ship Losses by Number (Ships over 500 GT)
Source: International Union of Maritime Insurance, 2010

The ISM Code itself is a thin document seeing that it is functional in outcome rather
than in process (Trafford, 2009), an indication of the need for flexibility and
adaptability in its implementing process (ICS & ISF, 2010). The overall objective of
the ISM Code is to encourage the shipping companies to establish the Safety
Management System for safety compliance with relevant international regulations.
The required Safety Management System shall constitute the company’s safety and
environmental protection policies, instructions and procedures for the safe operations
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of the vessel, procedures for the reporting of reporting accidents and
non-conformities, procedures to prepare for emergency situations as well as for
internal audits and management review (Pamborides, Holman, Fenwick & Willan,
1996).
The explicit requirement of prevailing risk assessment has been incorporated into the
new amendments of the ISM Code which have entered into force by 1 July, 2010
(IMO, 2008b). In compliance with the Code, the Company is obligated to establish
proper procedures to assess and manage all identified risk on board in relation to the
safety operation in a proper way as thorough and detailed as possible. The
requirement of risk assessment should be seen more than only paper document and
work to be done by the company.
The ISM Code itself is regarded as a piece of a legal “umbrella” (Herbert-Burns,
Bateman & Lehr, 2009) with a coverage of all the requirements on the vessel and
further extends the full responsibility to its company for safety compliance. It has
been noted that the innovative idea of involving management into shipping at the
legal level was inspired by large amounts of findings of a series of disasters from
which the authorities observed the absent function of management as the chief
factors which led to the accidents. It highlights the organizational controls in
contribution to maritime safety. By all means, inter alia, the legal requirements and
the unwritten or written guidance formulated from the long-run best maritime
practice and common sense, the company is obligated to ensure that the ship is in a
seaworthy condition at the commencement of its voyage. These elements in the Code
provide us with a reliably legal reference for analyzing the organizational factors in
the context below. In the case of a response to the contingency plan, for instance,
crew members are instructed to follow the procedure described in the contingency
plan. If they fail to prevent the occurrence or minimize the consequences by
observing the procedure, the management level is responsible for realizing such an
incremental need of perfecting such a procedure in terms of effectiveness and quality.
On the other hand, if the crew does not follow the procedure or follow the procedure
in a proper manner, further improvement should be made to enhance the education or
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training of the crew for the familiarization of the contingency response by the
company. In other words, the company should ensure that its employees follow the
proper instructions so as to complete their performance well, and in the case of
contingency, appropriate measures are taken to mitigate the potential consequence in
which the loss of life or property may occur. The organizational factors at the remote
end always go along with their influence on the proximal operation in accordance
with the stipulations in the Code. The management at each level of the organization
should therefore be aware of the importance of their functions; any tiny mishap of
which may lead to a disaster at the sharp end, and take care of the ship with due
diligence. Such emphasis of the fundamental function of organization in the ISM
Code constitutes the legal framework to assess the role of organizational factors in
maritime industry performance. This is further discussed in detail below.

2.2 Identification of the organizational factors in the ISM Code
To justify as to whether the organizational factors are properly functional or not, or
whether the responsible company acts in a reasonable or prudent way, in terms of
Safety Management System, depends on the following two elements: firstly, whether
the company has established an appropriate Safety Management System, and
secondly, whether the company takes proper actions to ensure the effective running
of the system. To clarify such questions, the identification of the organizational
factors involved in the Code becomes more than necessary.
In order to establish the linkage in relation to organizational factors between the ISM
Code and the selected model to be used, the general organizational function of the
ISM Code can be grouped into two categories: organizational influences which
represent the latent failures at the organizational level and further end away from the
seafarers end within the hierarchy of organization and supervision, on which the top
organization relies to fulfil its overall objective. Moreover, having been inspired by
the classification approach in Reason’s model (1990; 1997; 2008), the organizational
influences can be further divided into three sub-groups: resource, climate and process,
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while the supervision factors compose four families: inadequate supervision, planned
inappropriate operations, failure to correct a problem and supervisory violations.
More details about these factors are discussed in section 2.4 on how to adapt the
accident causation model.
In scrutinizing the context of the ISM Code, this has been stated in the form of
general principles and objectives as argued above. This leads to the divergent
interpretations of the elements in the Code. Thereby, IACS made its unified
interpretation

available

for

industrial

reference

to

facilitate

the

Code’s

implementation (IMO, 1995). Anyhow, whatever the interpretation is, the
involvement of the organizational factors in the context is sure. The real context to
stipulate in detail what the outcome shall be made begins with element 2, concerning
the company’s safety and environmental protection policy, while element 1 refers to
the associated definitions and general requirements to its applications. In element 2.1,
the company is obligated to set a safety and environmental protection policy
addressing how to achieve the overall objective of SMS, while all means shall be
taken into account of the effective fulfilling of the company’s policy at every level as
its general legal obligation.
In the following element, the company shall not reduce its assumed responsibility
imposed by the Code to be in control of all associated activities. The level of the
authority and lines of communication in relation to the safety operation shall be
clearly defined and documented by the company. A designated person shall be
appointed and ensured to be acted as a linkage between top management and its ship,
in order to ensure the sufficient resource support the board and monitor performance
of each ship by element 4. Besides, adequate resources and shore-based support from
the company shall be made available to the designated person for his complete
performance. Both full responsibilities and authorization of implementation and
verification of the requirements shall be authorized to the master by the company on
its behalf (element 5). The seafarers manned by the company on board, in particular
the master, are required to be qualified, certified and medically fit, with adequate
ability of understanding the related rules and effective communication. Effective
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updated training shall be proceduralized and given to meet the need of seafarers’
proficient performance (element 6).
The entire key operations on board shall be identified and assessed in advance and
documented with preparation of plans and instructions to standardize its critical
shipboard operations. In addition, each operation shall be assigned to the proper
personnel (element 7). Element 8 of the ISM Code stipulates the possibility of the
company to prepare corresponding measures for capping any possibly potential
threat. It has been noted that with its responsibility the company shall identify all
possible sources of potential threats and establish proper procedures to reduce the
possibility of conveyance of the potential threat into practice, plus programming
some appropriate associated exercises and drills.
Element 9 provides the system with an ability to self-learn and improve.
Corresponding

procedures

to

report

non-conformities

and

accidents

and

corresponding correction measures shall be established for the purpose of monitoring
its performance and enhancing its ability to self advance. One of the innovations of
the ISM Code requires record keeping for routine ship maintenance which shall be in
line with the relevant regulations, including ensuring the routine inspections, and
reporting and correcting deficiencies. The company shall ensure that the critical
equipment and system be recognized and all possible measures ought to be taken to
the incremental reliability of the equipment and system.
The last two elements stipulate that the documentation and internal safety audit
within both the ship and the company itself shall be carried out in accordance with
the requirements of the Code. The company shall ensure all the relevant and updated
documents are available on board. The internal safety audit provides an opportunity
of review and correction to perfect the SMS.
The above analyzed organizational factors in contributing to maritime safety are
introduced in Table 1. In addition, as mentioned above, a structure to define the
organizational factors is given in the table as well. The table gives a short description
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of each element in the context of the Code and a brief organizational function of each
element.

The ISM Code Descriptions

Element

Organizational functions

2.1

Statement of company’s policy.

Climate.

2.2

Implementation and maintenance of policy.

Climate.

3.1

Report its responsible company to authority.

Climate.

3.2
3.3
4

Responsibility, authority and interrelation of
related personnel.
Adequate resource and shore-based support.

Resources and process
Resources.
Resources, climate and

Designated persons.

inadequate supervision.
Climate and Inadequate

5.1

Responsibility of the master.

5.2

Overriding authority of the master.

Climate and Resources.

6.1

Qualification of the master.

Resources and Process.

6.2

Seafarers’ qualification.

Resources and Process.

6.3

Procedure of new assignments.

6.4

Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules.

6.5

Training requirements.

supervision.

Process, and shipborne and
shore supervision.
Resource.
Resources, process and planned in
appropriate operation.

6.6
6.7

Linguistic requirements to seafarers.
Effective

communication

capability

personnel.

Resource and planned in
appropriate operation.
of Resources and planned in
appropriate operation.
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7

Process and planned in

Plans for shipboard operations.

appropriate operation.
Process and planned in

8.1

Identification of potential threats.

8.2

Drill and exercises.

8.3

Measures to respond the hazard and accidents.

9.1

Non-conformities and accident report.

appropriate operation.
Process and planned in
appropriate operation.
Process and planned in
appropriate operation.
Process, failed to correct known
problems and Supervisory violations

Process and failed to correct

9.2

Implementation of corrective action.

10.1

Statutory maintenance.

10.2

Routine inspections.

10.3

Specific actions to the system failures.

10.4

Routine maintenance and test.

11.1

Procedure to control documentation and data.

Process.

11.2

Updated and available documentation.

Resources.

11.3

Effective control of documentation.

Process.

12

known problems
Process and planned in
appropriate operation.
Process and planned in
appropriate operation.
Process and planned in
appropriate operation.
Process and planned in
appropriate operation.

Company verification, review and evaluation.

Process, failed to correct know problems
and supervisory violations.

Table 1 An overview to the function of the ISM Code in terms of the organizational factors.
Source: Author.
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2.3 The selection of the accident causation model
The selection of the accident causation model for this study should be determined on
the basis of its capability to meet our requirements and preferences. Both the
theoretical and pragmatic concerns should be considered concerning the
organizational factors. By and large, in accordance with the discussed norms of a
systemic model (Leveson, 2004) that is in parallel with Hollnagel’s (2009, p.10)
three standards of a ‘good’ cause as well as ten criteria proposed by Benner (1985,
p.113), the causation model being chose should preferably be:
1. Adequately burgeoned theoretic foundation to support the model’s adaptation,
i.e. with a sound basis from safety management theory (particularly the
organizational factors indicated in Chapter 1) and accident analysis theory.
2. Structured and classified, i.e. clearly define the interaction of classified
components at the divergent levels.
3. The selected model’s applicability enough to cap all maritime accident and
incident data. This means, the framework of such a model should be adequate
to accommodate all underlying accident factors in its application.
In searching for the desired model, the author found the traditional models often used
in practice to analyze accident investigations do not fit the three norms above, as the
literature review (Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel, 2009, p.1310) on
investigatory manuals of eight Swedish organizations which rely on linear models
demonstrated the need of more systemic models in practice. Fortunately, a proposed
accident causation model, namely Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) model (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; 2003; Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2001), initially developed for the U.S. Military on the basis of Reason’s
model (1990; 1997) system, meets the demands above.
It has been learned that the HFACS framework bridges the gap between theory - its
original model - Reason’s model (1990; 1997) and practices by providing
investigators with a “comprehensive, user-friendly tool” for identifying and
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classifying the human causes of accidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Shappell &
Wiegmann, 2003). Such an incident analysis approach supported by a structured
taxonomy captures the range of active failures at the proximal side and latent
conditions at the remote side. This is why it prevails in the aviation field (Dambier &
Hinkelbein, 2006; Gaur, 2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001) and a variety of other
industries such as mining, oil, manufacturing, and medicine. For the maritime
industry, Celik and Cebi (2009) have proposed an analytical foundation for such a
model quantitatively characterizes the role of latent human errors by extending such
a model in a fuzzy environment to investigate shipping accidents. Its findings
pinpoint human error as contributing factors at different levels of the organization.
The HFACS model, after adaptation, was applied on a group of 41 accident
investigation reports concerning machinery space fire and explosion by Ghirxi
(2008). Its results have disclosed the need to investigate organizational factors which
should be taken care of as important as the technical failures in maritime accident
investigation.
Thereby, the HFACS model chiefly aims at solving the organizational factors in line
with the ISM Code, but in different ways. The following section focuses on how to
adapt the HFACS model in combination with the organizational factors identified in
the ISM Code in order to optimize its applicability in specific cases.

2.4 Integrate the ISM Code into Human Factors Analysis and
Classification System model
Since the similarities between the Reason’s model adopted by IMO (1997) and the
HFACS model and the linkage between the ISM Code and HFACS model have been
established previously, the possibility of applying the HFACS model in maritime
accident analysis becomes clear. To ensure all maritime factors involving the
HFACS model, and merging all the organizational factors defined in the ISM Code
into the HFACS model, the need to address the proper adaptation of the HFACS
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model, which was originally designed for aviation, becomes necessary. The next
section describes the revised HFACS model while considering Ghirxi’s (2008)
adapted framework and its origin from the US. Department of Defense (2005) in
hopes of being faithful to its origin and being practicable. The adapted model
includes five levels of failures: unsafe acts, preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe
supervision/workplace factors, organizational influences and social environment
influences, as explain below:
Unsafe Acts. The unsafe acts of seafarers can be generally categorized into two
groups: errors and violations (Reason, 1990). Errors, as the nature of the human
being, constitute skill-based, decision and perceptual errors, while the violations
include routine and exceptional violations. These unsafe acts are directly or
indirectly influenced through certain middle parts by the organizational factors which
more likely endanger the sharp end.
Skill-based errors refer to the failures without significant conscious thought. Within
the context of the maritime field, a lot of actions formed by conventional or
long-term practice are very vulnerable considering the fact that they always suffer
from the lack of attention or memory failure. During the safety patrol to pipe
connection operation before pumping oil to shore side, skill-based errors happen
often in ticking the checklist by assuming everything is perfect. Decision errors are
occurred when a problem is not well understood, and formal procedures and response
options are not available within SMS. In the maritime context, vessels when visiting
some ports without any knowledge about the local meteorological conditions often
need a pilot to service berthing for the purpose of avoiding decision errors.
Perceptual errors take place comparative less often than skill-based and decision
errors in the maritime realm. Such factors are in a mishap when failure occurs in the
perception of an object, threat or situation, resulting in a sluggish response to the
action.
Routine violations appear to be acceptable in a situation where no sanction or action
could be taken to prevent their occurrence. A proper lookout is often absent during
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navigation under low visible condition due to insufficient manning, however, such a
violation may not always lead to accidents. Routine violations happen on board with
the situation where the SMS does not follow all requirements of ISM Code, an
indication of something wrong in its manuals or procedures without coverage of all
the compulsory requirements, or their implementations. For instance, the internal
interval audit requires the line management to verify, review, analyze and correct
deficiencies and non-conformities on board, including such violations. There may be
some reasons for such violations, such as time pressure or deficiencies in the
procedures. However, for the shipping company, the tolerance of the routine
violations is assumed to be zero so that such violations will not be accumulated until
the accident occurs. As to exceptional violations, it may be attributed to the
speculation that operators assume these violations may not lead to a disaster. For
instance, vessel’s violation may be made by crossing the prohibited water area for a
short voyage against the time pressure.
The identification of unsafe acts has been proven to be fundamental so as to
determine who will be liable for the disaster, in particular in the event of involving
technical failure or unexpected meteorological circumstances. On board, even
well-prepared contingency plans cannot cover all emergency situations. Therefore,
seafarers are required to be able to make a proper and timely response with no
procedure to refer to. It is notable that currently people tend to off-handly attribute
the failure to human error in the end with an ignorance of the fundamental role of
technical failure and managerial deficiencies. Given that the crew has exercised due
diligence in their responsibilities, in the event of exceptional stormy weather, people
at the sharp end are in the realm of possibility to be blamed for their unsafe acts to
respond to the emergency, even though this may be due to, at least partly, the
technical failure being triggered by an unexpected storm.
Preconditions for unsafe acts. This step provides deeper analysis than the unsafe
acts on the internal or external circumstance that makes unsafe acts more likely to
happen. Exploring the preconditions for unsafe acts allows us to understand the
factors behind the unsafe acts. The preconditions for unsafe acts are divided into
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three categories: condition of crew members; environmental factors and personal
factors.
Condition of crew members can be classified into two groups: cognitive factors and
physiological state. Theoretically, both the cognitive factors and physiological state
play fundamental roles in driving people to commit unsafe acts. These factors vary
from diverse people at distinct stages and are not easy to be observed and studied,
especially in some cases where no seafarer concerned survives. In most maritime
cases, no such condition of crew members could be investigated unless such factors
stand out from the effect of unsafe acts. In accordance with the HFACS Quick Users
Guide by U.S. Department of Defense (2005), 8 types of factors, like inattention and
distraction, affect the cognitive factors, with a total of more than 47 types of
conditions, including but not limited to fatigue and motion sickness, are considered
in the realm of possibility to make the personal physiological state dysfunctional.
Internal environmental factors are primarily divided into two groups, the physical
and the technological environmental factors. The physical environmental factors
contain the internal in which the seafarer works and operates. The technological
environment normally looks into the technological condition of ships, including the
workspace design and equipment technological condition, depending upon what sort
of accident is being investigated.
Personal factors are traditionally divided into two staple categories: crew interaction
and personal readiness. Crew interaction among the bridge team is a symbolic factor
when investigating a collision case. In particular nowadays, the increasing presence
of multiple-national seafarers has emphasized the importance of crew interaction in
bridge management. In addition, personal readiness shows the extent to which the
seafarers are familiar with the fresh situations. In the ISM Code, the responsible
company is required to ensure the adequacy of familiarization with the new position
on board. Lack of personal readiness should not be interpreted as violation.
Unsafe supervision/workplace factors. At this level, four categories of unsafe
supervision

have

been

tagged,

namely
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inadequate

supervision,

planned

inappropriate operations, failure to correct a problem and supervisory violations.
Failure occurring at this level mostly refers to the management level on board which
directly affects and is approached by the organizational factors. The top management
intensively relies on this level to realize its management objective in the ISM Code
on board; the factors at this level are thereby highly related to the organizational
factors in the ISM Code at a higher level.
Inadequate supervision principally refers to the shipborne and shore supervision of
operations on board. One of the responsibilities required by the ISM Code of the
master is verifying that the specified requirements are observed. By the company’s
documented definition of the master’s responsibility, the master on behalf of the
company monitors and supervises the ship’s performance together with other senior
officers’ on board. In some cases, it shows the lack of supervision by the master to
approve and scrutinize the planned route leading to a grounding accident (Brown &
Haugene, 1998).
Planned inappropriate operations mainly address the shipborne operations that are
required by the ISM Code to the company which is due to maintain adequate and
proper procedures and plans of shipborne operations. Any inadequate or improper
procedures or plans of shipborne operations may increase the possibility of the onset
of an unsafe act, ultimately resulting in accidents. These operations include the
emergency preparedness on board as required in element 8 of the ISM Code for
instance.
Failure to correct known problems just reflect one of the most elementary features of
the SMS. The system requires the company to establish proper procedures to report
non-conformity and mishaps, and also trace such a deficiency until it is corrected or
mitigated at a satisfactory level. Within the ship, proper procedures should be
established and exercised to report and correct the problems so as to improve the
safety of ship operations. Take the chart small correction as an example. Failures to
exercise the chart small correction could be in such a category to increase the
possibility of a grounding or collision.
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Supervisory violations at this level reflect the tolerance to which extent the
management level on board can be accepted with the routine violations committed at
the sharp end. This is somehow related to the company’s safety policy and culture
and to the extent the routine violation can be accepted. In similarity to a tiny screw in
a machine, under certain conditions routine violations become more likely to result in
a tragic disaster when combined with other factors. Nowadays with the shortage of
senior seafarers, the acceptance of people with fraudulent certificates in some small
size vessels may jeopardize the safety of all crew.
Organizational Influences. Organizational influences as renowned latent failures are
at the top level and farthest end from the crew members within the hierarchy of the
organization. Four organizational factors have been labeled as follows: resource
management, organizational climate, organizational process and statutory, all of
which affect the supervisory actions, as well as the conditions and unsafe acts of
seafarers. The aim of the ISM Code is to require the company to establish and
maintain a proper procedure and plan to ensure sufficient resources to support the
ship, cultivate a proper climate within the organization and address appropriate
organizational processes. In line with the Reason’s “cheese” model, the introduction
of the ISM Code provides a complete view of how to plug the “holes” in the
“cheese” up at the level of organization influence until they are penetrated and
developed and an accident comes up.
Resource management includes all the resources the ship needs, i.e. human resources,
technological environment and equipment/facility resources. Adequate resource
support plays a key role in ensuring the system to maintain at an acceptable and
stable safety level. For instance, safety always becomes a loser in the battle of
fighting against resource support with productivity. In addressing this conflict and
prioritizing safety, the ISM Code specifically sets up a designated person to ensure
that there are adequate resources and shore-based support. In the aspect of
technological environment and equipment resources support, the company is
obligated to make sure that proper measures are taken to ensure the company can
respond at any time to resource demand from its ships.
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Organizational Climate is to seek to define proper organizational structure, policies
and culture within the organization. Element 3.2 in the ISM Code provides the
requirements for the company to define and document the responsibility, authority
and interrelation of all personnel related to safety management. For the policy, the
Code stipulates not only the aims to achieve in terms of safety and environmental
protection, but also the requirements to ensure how the aims are fulfilled and
maintained. Safety culture is the collective perception and practice on safety issues
within the organization (Toft & Reynolds, 1997, p.15). Take the master’s overriding
authority as an example; an organization’s priority of the master’s professional
decision-making in terms of safety and environmental protection can be viewed as
one component of safety culture.
Organizational process refers to the established operation plans and processes,
documented procedures and oversight. One of the most outstanding features of the
ISM Code is that it requires the company to document and standardize the operations
for the purpose of minimizing random and mistake operations. Such operations and
procedures include not only the routine operations and maintenance, but also the
emergent response; assisting the concerned people to observe the standard operation
sooner. Oversight refers to the system audit which provides an opportunity of overall
or partial scrutiny of the entire system, and the risk assessment. It is incumbent upon
any organization to cordially seek out the weakness of management and address it
through risk assessment approach for instance.
Social environment influences. This is an additional component in contrast to the
original HFACS framework, inspired by the Safety Control Theory of
“Human-Machine-Environment-Management” argued by Chen (1988) in his paper
and the systemic view to look into an organization as living with unpredictable
environment (Hollnagel, 2009, p.38). The social environment’s influences can be
subdivided into two categories: Statutory and external environment. They have
strong influence on both the shore management and the ship. In turn, both levels may
have the possibility of minimizing the social influence by improving management
and technology.
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Statutory is to reflect long-term social requirements. The reality that the development
of legislation always lags behind the tempo of technological innovation makes it
possible to seek the “holes” at this legislative level. It is necessary to address two
groups, namely international/national standards and administration implementation/
enforcement in this respect. The administration relies on the implementation of the
international/national standards to realize the safety management of its national fleet.
Notwithstanding, drastically innovative techniques often disconcert the slow
legislative development which may result in an inadequate safety standard.
Conventionally, the implementation and enforcement of statutory documentation
upon fleet depends upon the flag state administration, plus the port state
administration which plays as a supplementary role. In spite of the fact that no
requirement is imposed upon the company with regard to the responsibility of
statutory legislation in addition to its compliance, it is necessary for the company to
work together with the legislative agency by providing it with feedback.
External environment refers to the outside environment of the organization or ship in
sharp contrast to the physical environment of the operator. It mainly refers to the
meteorological factors, such as weather conditions which are often viewed as the
main factors that trigger the onset of an accident. Such factors reflect the vulnerable
feature of maritime safety when it encounters extreme meteorological conditions. For
instance, heavy fog may reduce the physical visibility of the operator, and then
increases the possibility of a collision at sea. Political/economic factors reflect the
short term social demand. For instance, the economic recession that started from the
end of 2008 may lead to a reduction of resource investment in safety in order to
maintain the commercial operations due to a limited budget. These reductions may
increase the possibility of maritime risks at sea. The third one is navigation aids or
conditions referring to the outside navigation environment, such as the VTS, light
buoy or some other items that may influence the safety of navigation as well.
In conclusion, an overview of the adapted HFACS framework (table 2) combined
with the functions of the ISM Code, is described and discussed above. The adapted

25

HFACS framework gives us a new view with reference to how the ISM Code seeks
the “holes” within an organization and addresses them at all organizational levels. By
integrating the organizational factors into the HFACS framework, the significance of
organizational factors identified in the ISM Code is assumed to be fundamental in
defense of maritime safety which is applied into practice and further discussed in the
following chapters.
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1st Tier
Social
Environment
influences

Organizational
Influences

HFACS framework
2nd Tier
3rd Tier
y International/national
standards
Statutory
y Administration
Implementation/enforcement
y Meteorological factors
External
y Political/economic factors
environment
y Navigation aids/conditions
y Human Resources
y Technological
Environment
y Equipment/Facility
Resources
Resources

Organizational
climate

y Structure
y Policies
y Culture
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ISM Descriptions

ISM
Code

y

y

y

y

y Definition of responsibility, authority and
interrelation of related personnel
y Adequate resource and shore-based support
y Designed persons
y Authority of the master
y Qualification of the master
y Seafarers’ qualification
y Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules
y Training requirements
y Linguistic requirements to seafarers
y Effective communication capability of personnel
y Statutory maintenance support
y Updated and availabe documentation
y Statement of company’s policy
y Implementation and maintenance of policy
y Report its responsible company to authority
y Definition of responsibility, authority and
interrelation of related personnel

y 3.2
y 3.3
y4
y 5.2
y 6.1
y 6.2
y 6.4
y 6.5
y 6.6
y 6.7
y 10.1
y 11.2
y 2.1
y 2.2
y 3.1
y 3.2
y4

y Operations
y Procedures
y Checks and balances

Organizational
Process

Unsafe
supervision/
workplace factors

y Shipborne and shore
supervision

Inadequate
supervision

y Ship borne operations

Planned
appropriate
operations

in

28

y Designated persons
y Responsibility of the master
y Authority of the master
y Qualification of the master
y Seafarers’ qualification
y Process of the new assignments
y Training requirements
y Plans for shipboard operations
y Identification of potential threats
y Drill and exercises
y Measures to respond the hazard and accidents
y Non-conformities and accident report
y Implementation of corrective action
y Statutory maintenance
y Routine inspections
y Procedure to control documentation and data
y Effective control of documentation
y Company verification, review and evaluation
y Designated persons
y Responsibility of the master
y Procedure of new assignments
y Training requirements
y Linguistic requirements to seafarers
y Effective communication capability of personnel
y Plans for shipboard operations
y Identification of potential threats.
y Drill and exercise

y 5.1
y 5.2
y 6.1
y 6.2
y 6.3
y 6.4
y7
y 8.1
y 8.2
y 8.3
y 9.1
y 9.2
y 10.1
y 10.2
y 11.1
y 11.3
y 12
y4
y 5.1
y 6.3
y 6.5
y 6.6
y 6.7
y7
y 8.1
y 8.2

y Shipborne related
Failed to correct
shortcomings
known problems

Preconditions for
unsafe acts

Supervisory
violations
Internal
Environmental
factors
Condition of crew
members
Personal factors

Unsafe acts

Error
Violation

y Shipborne violations
y Physical
y Technological
y Cognitive factors
y Physiological state
y Crew resources
managment
y Personal readiness
y Skill-based
y Decision
y Perceptional
y Routine
y Exceptional

y Measures to respond the hazard and accidents
y Statutory maintenance
y Routine inspections
y Specific actions to the system failures
y Routine maintenance and test
y Measures to respond the hazard and accidents
y Non-conformities and accident report
y Implementation of corrective action
y Non-conformities and accident report
y Company verification, review and evaluation
y

y 8.3
y 10.1
y 10.2
y 10.3
y 10.4
y 8.3
y 9.1
y 9.2
y 9.1

y

y

y

y

y

y

y

y

Table 2 An overview of the adapted HFACS framework based on the framework developed by the US. Department of Defense.

Source: Author.
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Chapter 3 Case Studies

Since proper theoretical foundation has been established and an appropriate
causation model has been adapted and adopted, the next step is moving to test its
applicability in practice. This chapter focuses on case studies that apply the model in
two diverse specific maritime cases with the purpose of seeking the feasibility of
application of the adapted HFACS framework into specific maritime cases and
acquiring evidence of how the organizational factors are functional in maritime
safety. To achieve these aims, the synopsis and official findings and analysis of each
accident will be briefly introduced according to their respective official reports
(CMSA, 2008; JAIC, 1997) online, subsequently with the corresponding re-analysis
of the cases from the perspective of the adapted HFACS framework in accordance
with their flow of event developments, then integrating each contributory factor into
the framework by its classification. However, in order to fairly treat the official
analysis on the basis of the same fact, the re-analysis by the new insight attempts to
shun the introduction of the new evidence from other sources, otherwise possibly
leading to adverse results. In the end of each case study, short conclusions from
comparisons between two differing manners will be made available for further
discussion in the next chapters in relation to the objectives stated in Chapter 1.
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3.1 Case 1-ESTONIA disaster on 28 September, 1994
3.1.1 The accident
The ro-ro passenger ferry ESTONIA under the Estonia flag was operating between
Tallinn of Estonia, and Stockholm of Sweden. The vessel owned by Estiline
Maritime Company Limited, however, was virtually operated by its parental
company, Estonia Shipping Company Limited, which is an Estonia state-owned
company, and had a maximum carrying capacity of 2000 passengers.
On the evening of 27 September 1994 at 1915 the ferry left Tallinn with 989 people,
803 of whom were passengers, for a routine voyage to Stockholm. At the moment
when the vessel left the sheltered waters, sea conditions along the Estonian coast
became harsher than before, with a gradually increasing wind to a velocity of 18-20
m/s and a wave height of approximately 4 m; a sufficient height to flood the car deck.
The vessel proceeded her route at a full speed of around 15 knots with four engines
fully running.
At about 0045 hours the first abnormal metallic sounds were heard by several
witnesses indicating something was wrong. Nothing was gained from the position of
the bow visor after the seaman of the watch was instructed to find out what the
source of the noise was. 15 minutes later, the key part, the bow visor, separated from
the bow subsequently opening the ramp completely. A great amount of water entered
the car deck with a high rate due to the full speed against the wind and sea waves,
rapidly resulting in a heavy starboard list. Due to the unbelievable speed at which the
tragedy developed there was little chance to prepare a response, with the result that
many people with inadequate time were trapped in their cabins. Those who
successfully approached the boat deck jumped overboard or were washed into the sea
with or without life jackets. No lifeboats could be launched due to the heavy list.
Shortly after the internal alarm a Mayday call was transmitted at around 0120. All
four main engines were stopped and the main generators were stopped as well
afterwards. Furthermore, with the increased water in the vessel, the list was more
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than 90 degrees. The vessel sank rapidly, stern first, and disappeared from the radar
screens of ships proceeding for assistance in the area at about 0150 hours. As a result,
137 persons survived from the accident following rescue, while 852 people died.
3.1.2 Findings of the disaster released by the Joint Accident Investigation
Commission of Estonia, Sweden and Finland
The JAIC believed that the cause to the capsizing of the vessel was the detachment of
the visor, of which the locking device failed to withstand the wave-induced load,
which lead to a great amount of sea water entering the car deck, following the heavy
listing and then sinking of the vessel. It was established that the most wanted part of
the investigation was to find out why the failure of the bow visor happened in this
case. The maximum withstanding capabilities of the visor against the varied
wave-induced and wind-induced force with diverse vessel speeds were thereafter
simulated and calculated in authorized laboratories. It was quantitatively concluded
that the design load and distribution of the visor on the attachments as installed were
insufficient to sustain wave-induced impact loads on the night of this accident.
By observing the recovered visor traced on the seabed some distance from the wreck,
and recalculating how much load the visor could virtually withstand, the team found
it short of the designed load of the visor, and that this was the main reason why the
attachment failed on the night of the disaster. It has been noted that the visor locking
device was not produced in the light of the design intent, an indication of a scarcity
of affordable load. The load calculation was only done by the shipyard without the
involvement of the supervised construction classification, Bureau Veritas, in that no
such guideline or regulation was in place at that time.
To make matters worse, the approval of the hull inspection by the Finnish Maritime
Administration greatly rested on the Classification Society. Instead of itself, the
Administration did not further examine or inspect the water load of the visor as long
as it got the certificate from the Classification Society.
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Besides the failure of the attachment of the visor, the JAIC has concluded some
contributory factors which attributed to the disaster. Factors like encountering
prevailing and unacceptable weather conditions, and inadequate attention and
alertness from both the administration and company sides in response to the exposure
of deficiencies of the bow visor on similar vessels were also firmly identified in the
JAIC report. The improper installation of the upper extension of the collision
bulkhead which did not comply with the requirements of the SOLAS regulations had
been determined as one of the contributory factors to the disaster.
Some actions by the crew were also marked as being relevant to the aftermath. At the
moment of the first signal of unconventionality occurred, the bridge was not aware of
what happened on board until the heavy list of the vessel was exposed. This
information was vital and essential in determining the following remedied measures.
No reduction of speed was therefore taken even after receiving more than two reports
of abnormal metallic bangs. The efforts to find out information on the source of
bangs failed. It seems that the crew members neither watched the TV monitor, nor
asked those in the control room from where the ingress was observed. The most
effective way to remind crew of the failure of the visor by the position sensors did
not work, unfortunately. Subsequently, almost no warning message as early as it
should be, was successfully released or broadcasted to the passengers involved in this
disaster. Further the Mayday call was transmitted later than supposed. The short time
available for response made the evacuation and taking courtermeasures meaningless,
resulting in the chaotic situation faced by the crew and passengers. The Commission
further asserted that the crew on board were not aware of the visor incident taking
place on other similar vessels at that time.
In summary, the JAIC report is a document emphasizing and detailing the technical
issues which concluded that the accident resulted from the failure of the bow visor.
This report appears to be in favor of technique failure more than management failure
in fact, otherwise more people at the blunt end would be blamed for their
management failure. Most of the failures were analyzed on a surface level, not able
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to imply how to prevent such failure reoccurring. All the contributory factors in
relation to the occurrence of the accident as analyzed above are screened in Table 3.

Cause

Type of error or

Description

Systemic cause or

other failure

preventive action

The detachment of the

From the analysis, it was

ESTONIA's

concluded

bow

visor

leads amounts of water to

Technical

enter into cardeck, sinking

failure

that

this

failure was due to the

Direct cause

the vessel.

wave-induced
loads

and

impact
lack

of

designed load.
The accurate and timely
The sea condition that the
ESTONIA experienced at
Contributory
causes

that night was shocking
and

abnormal

to

obtaining
Meteorological
condition

the

vessel itself.

of

weather

reports could be as a
source to refer to and
make the right decision
and prevent such an
accident.

The

visor

attachments

There was no industry or

were not designed in the

Design error

light of realistic design
assumptions.

regulatory standard at
that time as a reference
to set the designed load.
No information on bow

The master on board had

visor

a very limited knowledge

Training

of the potential danger of

deficiency

the bow visor closure
concept.

failures

systematically
intentionally

was
and

collected,

warned and disseminated
within the company and
its ships.

Failure to indicate the

Equipment
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The position sensors of

opening bow visor in the

failure

ramp and bow visor were

bridge control panel to

not well designed and

inform to crew on bridge

maintained

prior to the occurrence.

manner even though they

in

good

were approved by the
administration.
The installation of the
upper extension of the
collision bulkhead did not
comply
requirements

with
of

the

The

Commission

believes

that

the

non-conformity of the
Design failure

collision bulkhead has a
somehow positive effect

the

on the entering a mount

SOLAS regulations.

of water the cardeck.

Table 3 An overview of accident analysis of the ESTONIA according to the JAIC report.
Source: author.

3.1.3 Analysis of the case by application of the HFACS framework
According to what we have learned from the aforementioned discussion of the
rationality and principle of the adapted HFACS framework, as well as its established
linkage with the elements of the ISM Code, the proper theory is ready for analyzing
and recategorizing such complex disaster for the purpose of evaluating the role of
organizational factors in maritime safety and diagnosing how the adapted HFACS
framework functions in the maritime context. The basic purpose of such an effort
here is to search a new insight into mechanisms through which safety is achieved
through a fresh analysis of such a case from the human error perspective, rather than
attempting to analyze them by citing the additional sources to criticize the old report.
Someone may doubt the feasibility of applying the doctrine of the ISM Code to
justify the organizational role in such case in that the implemented ISM Code was
not yet in place at the time of ESTONIA. However, the origin of the ISM Code - IMO
Resolution A.595 (15) called on the need to develop the guidelines on shipboard and
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shore-based management (UK MCA, 2009) and the discussion in Chapter 2 has
already implied that the ISM Code is a legal and operational umbrella in the
maritime field, most of which as analyzed previously stem from operations in the
course of maritime history, namely common sense or best practices. For instance, in
the case of the HERALD OF FREE ENTERPRISE disaster on 6 March 1987, when
no such ISM Code was in place either, the management factors such as “the absent
responsibility extended as high as the Board of Director level” (Whittingham, 2004),
were already throwing light on as the equivalent influential factors at the remote end
with those factors at the proximal end. In spite of the fact that at the time when the
accident occurred, the requirement to the management level on its responsibility to
frontline operation had not yet been available legally, at least in written form, so the
court still imposed the company’s corresponding responsibility on the management
level according to its deficient management. It is thereby justified to analyze such a
case based on the doctrine of the ISM Code.
Before going into details on the latent conditions which create an environment for the
sharp end operators to more likely commit unsafe acts, there is a need to clarify what
an unsafe act is. Equally important is the question which sort of unsafe act is
involved, error or violation. Surprisingly, the official report appears to be reluctant to
distinctly disclose any unsafe acts. The report use a great number of chapters to focus
more on technical details, such as what is the possibility of the bow visor failure and
why the bow visor failed, but with few words on what is the human operation in
relation to the failure of the bow visor, without a clear clue on what the unsafe act is.
Based on recognized details in the official report, there was no unsafe act at the sharp
end involved in the initial event. The other latent failures have been analyzed as
follows in accordance with the flow of event developments.
Firstly, the technical resource support from the company appeared to be inadequate
for the required maintenance and operations on board.
Daily experiences suggest that the lack of technical support may greatly result in
various serious negative aftermaths on board, e.g. deteriorated maintenance
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operational level. The report has been of the opinion that there were some
deficiencies found by the trainee PSCOs prior to the accident, nevertheless, no
further attention was drawn by either the master or the management level on shore.
Unfortunately, no details on how the management or supervision carefully responded
to such a fatal deficiency prior to the commencement of this voyage are given. The
pronounced and tightened conflict between production and the safety has been
proved conclusively in this case when the master decided to sail for the sake of time
pressure rather than caring about safety margin despite the absence of rubber
packings in the visor. With reference to the requirements in the ISM Code, the
shipping company should ensure adequate resource and shore-based support to the
ship’s operation and maintenance. The dismayed ignorance of missed or damaged
rubber packings which assure the watertightness of the external visor gave rise to two
developments: losing the watertightness of the visor which would allow water to
enter inside and create a resultant force directed at about 45 degrees forward and
down, as the official report admitted, and increasing the possibility of vibrating or
shaking, which further leads to accelerated wear and induces fatigue to the
connections between the bow visor and shell plates as well as the cleats, hinges and
bolts. These problems growingly caused the probability of the visor failing to attach
under harsh weather conditions where the accident took place. Similar maintenance
operation problems containing damage to the locking devices which reduced the
strength were observed. In addition, the dysfunction of the signal lamps of the ramp
and bow visor position sensors, respectively, failing to indicate the state of the ramp
and bow visor reflected the poor management on board and shore-based. No
established proper procedure and process supports such maintenance prior to the
departure. These problems could be categorized as resource support from the shore
side and process failure in accordance with the Table in Chapter 2.
Secondly, the non-compliance with the SOLAS regulations regarding the upper
extension of the collision bulkhead reflects the failure occurred at levels of
management within the company as well as administrations.
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As best safety practice, before flagging into Estonia to start the new operation, the
shipowner should have been sufficiently aware of the essential need to ensure the
vessel’s condition was in compliance with all relevant international Conventions and
national law in order to run the vessel on a full international route. In spite of the fact
that there was no document showing the evidence of exempting the bulkhead from
the administrations during the construction and the short international operation, due
to the hesitating attitude of the IMO at that time on whether the requirement should
be further extended to passenger ships or not, administrations by and large accepted
the fact without proper collision bulkhead by acquiescence, equally with exemption.
However, since the 1981 Amendments to SOLAS entered into force in 1984
specifying the requirement of the collision bulkhead on passenger ships, the new flag
administration was supposed to follow the requirement. Neither in the course of the
first inspection by the administration prior to the new traffic in Estonia, nor the
following two inspections, was any proper remark made to non-compliance with the
SOLAS regulations regarding the upper extension of the collision bulkhead. As the
professional and recognized organization on the classification survey, Bureau Veritas
did not observe any deficiency either in their first survey or annual survey due to the
scarcity of the bulkhead requirement in the SOLAS Convention.
Thirdly, remote factors failing at the vessel transferring stage resulted in a sequel of
the vessel’s capsizing with regard to certificate management.
As the report revealed, the original safety navigation certificate, which is sufficient to
meet the initial route issued by the Finnish Maritime Administration, was only
intended for the short international voyage sailing within 200 nm between two ports.
The reasons why the authority issued the short international voyage were not
recovered in detail, but surely based on the actual operating voyage in terms of the
meteorological conditions and distance. Therefore, including the upper extension of
the collision bulkhead, several requirements to such a vessel in the operation of such
voyage were exempted by the Finnish Authority. Both the new company
management and administration were not aware of the need to fully assess the
feasibility of the vessel to run in a tougher meteorological condition and longer
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voyage than the previous one so that actually the vessel was running over a voyage
area out of its reach. Such a symbolic governmental job was utterly authorized to
Classification Society - Bureau Veritas - the same one as under the Finnish flag.
Based on an agreement between Bureau Veritas and the company it was merely
arranged for certain items not covered by the conventions to be taken care of, for
instance, the drawing plan was not scrutinized, rather than a full survey. In spite of
the fact that there may have been some uncovered truth behind the agreement, one
thing is sure here and that is the lack of any effective certificate management from
the company management perspective.
Fourthly, the company was not mindful of a potential hazard on board which had
been warned by a series of similar serious incidents occurring in maritime industry.
Despite the absence of a legal requirement risk assessment for the time, the
frequently occurred incidents associated with the failure of the bow visor should
have reminded the management level to notice its seriousness of the hazard. To be an
informative and responsible company, onshore management should have collected,
analyzed and distributed the intensive occurred accidents related to such analogical
passenger ship’ safety, and educated their crew on board to enhance safety awareness.
The company satisfied itself with the proud reason that the bow visor of the
ESTONIA was the latest and biggest design at the time of construction. In addition, it
has been noted that the master and crew, who were limited to access such
information based on the limited resources on board, lacked knowledge and
awareness on the hazard of the bow visor; otherwise they could have noticed soon
the source of bang sound and take necessary countermeasures. The occurrence of
numerous incidents analyzed in the official report had already given the evidence
that the timely observation of the failure or part - failure was rather conducive to
minimize the consequence of the incidents. As a matter of fact, most vessels involved
in the cases occurring successfully recovered from the risk of disaster by reducing
the speed or stopping the voyage. In the statistics of the cases it was stated in the
official report, that most cases (12 out 14) were triggered by the heavy weather and
waves. Likewise, if the management had been sufficiently mindful of the negative
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effect of the heavy weather to underpin the safety margin by authorizing the master
with the freedom of navigation decision-making in terms of time pressure, this case
would have had the biggest probability to be eradicated or at least mitigated.
However, for the company, it is a failure that the potential hazard of the bow visor
finally resulted in such disaster.
On the one hand, no extensive research by the industry was made to find out the
common reasons in such incidents and enhance the safety standard in the related
regulations with regard to the failure of the bow visor. The affected administrations
and classification societies, involving major ones, were satisfied with the fact that the
strengthened requirements to the affected vessels were enhanced, and such new
requirements were only applied to new constructions. The ESTONIA heavily slapped
the industry with a disaster for the compromised result between the administrations
and industry that the new requirement was not applicable to existing vessels,
including the ESTONIA. Unfortunately, these unacceptable attitudes are still
prevailing nowadays for the reason of the mount of costs arising from the
implementation of the new legislation on existing vessels.
Last but not least, looking back to the design stage of construction, there were no
legal standards or requirements for the bow visor loads at the national level which
made the role of classification and administration in monitoring the bow visor design
and production voluntary. The official report claimed that the shortage of the
designed load led to the failed resistance against the wave-induced impact. Again,
this suggested the industrial legislation or standard development was lagging behind
technical innovation.
To sum up, there is no unsafe act, but with the named active failure involved in this
case, where a number of latent failures constitutes those causation events in the
course of accident development from the blunt ends which were creating the
deteriorated surroundings for the sharp end to be more likely to suffer the aftermath
of poor management. The whole new picture of the analyzed brief causation graph in
the adapted HFACS framework is described in Table 4.
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1st Tier

2nd Tier

3rd Tier

★Absence of national law on standardizing
the exemption and scrutinizing the hull
survey.
★Vacuum role of administration on hull

Social Environment

Statutory

survey for flag changing.
★ Lagged law reaction to restrict the

influences

frequently and similarly occurred accidents.
★Absence of standards and requirements
on bow visor design
External
environment
Organizational
Influences

Resources

y Meteorological factors
y Political/economic factors
y Navigation aids/conditions
y Definition of responsibility, authority
and interrelation of related personnel
y Adequate resource and shore-based
support
y Designed persons
y Authority of the master
y Qualification of the master
y Seafarers’ qualification
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★

Encountering

the

exceptional

meteorological condition.
★Inadequate shore-based resource support
to board maintenance and operations.

Remote from the ship

Latent Conditions

y International/national
standards
y Administration
Implementation/enforcement

ESTONIA Causation

Organizational
climate

Organizational
Process

y Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules
y Training requirements
y Linguistic requirements to seafarers
y Effective communication capability of
personnel
y Statutory maintenance support
y Updated and available documentation
y Statement of company’s policy
y Implementation and maintenance of
policy
y Report its responsible company to
authority
y Definition of responsibility, authority
and interrelation of related personnel
y Designated persons
y Responsibility of the master
y Authority of the master
y Qualification of the master
y Seafarers’ qualification
y Process of the new assignments
y Training requirements
y Plans for shipboard operations
y Identification of potential threats
y Drill and exercises
y Measures to respond the hazard and
accidents
y Non-conformities and accident report
y Implementation of corrective action
y Statutory maintenance
y Routine inspections
y Procedure to control documentation and
data
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★Failure to collect, analyze and distribute
similar accidents.

★Failure to manage the deficiency in the
certificate in terms of short voyage.
★Failure to respond the deficiency found
prior to the commencement of the voyage.
★ Failure to maintain the bow visor in
proper condition.
★Failure to identify the non-compliance
with the SOLAS regulations regarding the

y Effective control of documentation
y Company verification, review and
evaluation

upper extension of the collision bulkhead.
★Shortage to identify the potential hazard
on board with reference to the bow visor.
★Shortage of training the crew over the
bow visor management.

Unsafe supervision/
workplace factors

Inadequate
supervision

Planned
appropriate
operations

in

Failed to correct
known problems

y Designated persons
y Responsibility of the master
y Procedure of new assignments
y Training requirements
y Linguistic requirements to
seafarers
y Effective communication
capability of personnel
y Plans for shipboard operations
y Identification of potential threats.
y Drill and exercise
y Measures to respond the hazard
and accidents
y Statutory maintenance
y Routine inspections
y Specific actions to the system
failures
y Routine maintenance and test
y Measures to respond the hazard
and accidents
y Non-conformities and accident
report
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★Failure to maintain the visor and ramp
position indicator in order.
★Failure to maintain the locking device in
order.
★Shortage of training the crew over the
bow visor management.

★Failure to correct the absence of rubble
packings.

Supervisory
violations
Preconditions for
unsafe acts

y Implementation of corrective
action
y Non-conformities and accident
report
y Company verification, review and
evaluation
y Physical
y Technical

★Running out of its original certificated
voyage area.

Environmental
factors

★Deficiencies in the bow visor regarding
the inadequacy of design.

Personal factors
Unsafe acts

Error
Violation

y
y
y
y
y
y
y

Crew interaction
Personal readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgment errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

Table 4 An overview of analyzing ESTOINA disaster by the adapted HFACS framework.
Source: Author.
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Proximity to the ship

Active failures

Condition of crew y Cognitive factors
y Physiological state
members

3.1.4 Outcomes of the comparison between the original findings by JAIC and
further analysis by HFACS
Since the final JAIC report represents only a summary and therefore does not mean
first hand statements or materials, it should be born in mind that this ultimately
affects the accuracy of the result of the re-analysis of the accident report. Some
information necessary for re-analysis in the framework may not be available or
accessible. The interpretations or assumptions made are therefore only based on the
refined materials from the official report, and may not be as exact as those stemming
from the raw material. Furthermore, without the mandatory ISM Code in place at that
time, there was no legal responsibility for the company to be in compliance with it.
Anything assumed in the above section is based on the philosophy of the ISM Code.
However, those limitations do not impede the purpose of the re-analysis of this case,
which is to test as to whether the adapted framework is proper to apply in the specific
case, not to refer to evaluate as to whether the result is right or not. Thus, based on
the above limited assumptions, some short findings are observed from the
comparison between the original report and the re-analysis:
1. More latent or remote factors on the environment to create the possibility of
such an accident have come clear from the re-analysis. If we could code a
certain value into each factor, according to the approach similarly done by
Brown and Haugen (1998), we could then evaluate the influential proportion of
each factor in this case.
2. Since the latent or remote factors were clearly presented and structured in the
framework, recommendations generated from such a way make more sense and
directive.
3. Even though there is no unsafe act at the sharp end, the latent organizational
factors are still greatly influential in the safety performance on board.
4. The statutory requirement in place is vital to guarantee the active role of the
organization in ensuring maritime safety.
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5. The selections of the initial event and stop event from the new insight appear to
be better and more reasonable than those from the traditional one.

3.2 Case 2-QINFENG 128 accident on 27 March, 2008
3.2.1 The accident
The multiple-purpose cargo vessel QINFENG 128, under the Chinese flag with 7122
GT, called at Ningbo, China via the southern fairway of Jintang Island from Tianjing,
a northern port mainly for exporting coal from the mines in China. During the period
of anchorage, when waiting for the berthing order, the exchange of crew, including a
new master, took place on board according to the shipowner’s crew exchange order.
Two days later at 0025 on 27 March, when the vessel had completely unloaded all
coal, it unmoored and sailed to Tianjing again to loading coal via a short cut route;
the eastern fairway of the Jintang Island, where a new bridge, namely the Jintang
Great Bridge, with a length of approximate 18km over the sea, had been constructed
since 2005. At this stage of bridge construction, non-construction-related vessels
were not allowed to pass through any bridge spans aside from the central
navigational bridge span and western side navigational bridge span next to the
central bridge span, which had already been put into use for a few months.
Unfortunately, the vessel decided to sail with a velocity of 14 knots against the wind
through the western side bridge non-navigation span as it was planned, where the
new concrete bridge box girders had just been put across the supporting piers a
couple of days earlier, and had not yet been fixed permanently. Even with very good
visibility that night, the fore mast, conning bridge and Radar mast of QINFENG 128
subsequently crashed into two pending concrete bridge box girders between the
No.E19-E20 supporting piers.
Finally, two pending concrete bridge box girders over the supporting piers fell down,
collapsing the fore mast, the conning bridge and Radar mast of the QINFENG 128
and then landed on the compass deck of the vessel with the consequence that four

46

crew on the bridge died, including the new master, chief officer, second officer and a
wheel man, and the vessel grounded. The fallen bridge box girders broke into several
pieces but were still connected by the reinforcing steel bar inside the box girders and
some damage was caused to the span bridge supports as well.
3.2.2 Findings of the disaster released by the official investigatory report
It has been learned that in order to ensure the safety of the bridge - the constructed
operation, the Navigation Order prohibited any non-related vessels to sail within a
700 m area of the bridge operation on each side. 14 pairs of warning light-buoys in
good condition were set up on both sides of the operation areas. In addition, 7 pairs
of navigation light-buoys were set up on the way to two navigation bridge apertures.
With reference to this Navigation Order, the official report has established that the
direct cause of the accident was the vessel’s violation, no mater intentionally or
unintentionally, to sail through the bridge - constructed operational water area,
non-navigational bridge span between No.E19-E20 supporting piers. This conclusion
was evidenced by its navigation track of the vessel history prior to the collision with
the bridge as recorded by the company’s navigation track system.
The natural question in connection with exploring the cause of this accident is why
they decided to choose the short cut fairway rather than the fairway from which the
vessel approached to the port. Due to the fact that all the duty crew, including the
master and second mate, died, no certain answer can be given in response to such a
question-why they violated the Navigation Order to go through the prohibited,
narrow and shallow water area rather than that allowed, wide and deep water area.
However, two possibilities with regard to explanations to such questions were
attempted to be established.
Firstly, the crew members, especially the master, had not been informed by the
message that the concrete bridge box girders had already been put there, nor did the
duty crew notice the concrete bridge box girders, with a negligent lookout, even
under good visibility at that night. The master had just joined the ship, and a few
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days earlier the concrete bridge box girders had just stood there. There was no
evidence that the master noticed such information.
Secondly, the estimation of the net height of the bridge span above the water was
insufficient for the requirement of actual height, providing that the master knew the
fact that two pending concrete bridge box girders were there. According to the local
meteorological report on the tide information, a calculation was made of the net
height of the bridge span above the water, which was less than 15.1m considering the
tide effect. Under the condition of idle load, the top point of the fore mast was more
than 22m, while that of the Radar mast was more than 21.8m. As a result, the clear
height of the bridge span was insufficient to pass under such a low draft and an over
height vessel.
In searching the chart the vessel applied in this voyage, the absence of a chart small
correction was believed to be a significant contributory factor to the occurrence of
the violation, and the accident. Even though every Notices to Mariners, including
that concerning the information of setting up the navigation prohibited zone
especially for a bridge construction, from the chart station being timely distributed to
the vessels, no mark about the chart small correction was found on the chart in the
spot area. On the chart, the planned route had been drawn, as it actually went through,
to pass through that prohibited water area, deviating 1 nm far away from the western
side of the navigational bridge span. Conclusively, the second mate drew the planned
route on the basis of shortage of chart small correction.
In summary, no matter if the master approved the planned route in advance or not,
this is a case where the master should be responsible for the negligence of his duty to
ensure the safety of this ship. The whole picture of the analyzed causes to this case is
drawn in the Table 5 as shown below:
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Crew’s violation to pass

Systemic cause or preventive
action
The crew on duty should always

through

maintain with full due care on

Causes

Direct

Type of error
or other failure

Description

the

prohibited

navigational water area.

the safety information, so that
Violation

Cause

the

master

can

determine

informatively the right sailing
route

without

negligent

violation.
The absence of a small
correction on the chart on the
information

of

prohibited

The master should supervise the
Violation

chart timely informative with

navigational water area.

small correction.

Wrongly planned route for

When making the planned route,

navigation to Tianjing port

Planned

the responsible mate should refer

error

to all relevant safety information
to ensure the safety on route.

Contributory
Causes

responsible mate to make the

Overestimation of the safety

When passing the bridge span

margin of the net height

Skill-based

and estimating the height of the

above the water area across

error

vessel, the tide and draft should

the aperture.

often be taken into account.

Negligent lookout of the

The proper lookout is needed to

duty crew who did not

be

observe

the

bridge

Violation

maintained

circumstances

in
on

all
board,

contributed to the occurrence

whenever the master is on board

of the accident.

or not.

Table 5 An overview of the cause analysis of QINFENG 128 according to its official report.

Source: Author.
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3.2.3 Analysis of the case by application of the adapted HFACS framework
From the perspective of the human error causation framework as discussed in
Chapter 2, the application of the adapted HFACS model is described in the way that
highlights the latent failures, based on the unveiled details in the official report.
By its very nature, the feasibility of the application of the adapted HFACS
framework with reference to the ISM Code to this case seems to be appropriate. The
ship’s responsibility to implement the ISM Code since 2005 has been delegated and
contracted to the shipping company which is a specialized shipping management
company with dozens of non-itself-owned ships from diverse shipowners, which
provides the foundation of applying the doctrine of the ISM Code in this case.
Referring to its shipping manager independent from the shipowner, the need to
introduce some background of the management is necessary to better understand the
latent failures.
A couple of months prior to the accident, the shipowner of the QINFENG 128 signed
a sales contract with a view that the new shipowner took over the full responsibility
of its management half a month before the accident, however, without notifying its
shipping company. In accordance with the supplemented contract signed later, the
registration change of the vessel would not be applied until the final payment, half of
which had already been transacted successfully, being completed. Thereby, instead
of its shipping company, the new shipowner virtually took control of the vessel since
the contract had been signed, but with no change of its registration prior to the
accident.
In knowing the confused organizational responsibilities, we now could throw light on
several developments from latent failures to active failures. Compared to the first
case analyzed above, this case would be comparatively simple structured in failure
event flows. Undebatably, the duty mate and master should be blamed for their
violation of approaching the prohibited navigational water area, which is of course
the unsafe act, and the improper lookout before the collision so that the crew had
insufficient time to take the proper measures of prevention, in the adapted HFACS
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framework. The remote failures in this case were analyzed by its developments of
event flow as follows.
First of all, as an elementary source of essential navigation information, no document
on board is more significant than the chart and its publications in the aspect of
ensuring safe navigation. The obtained evidence of the chart used in this voyage
suggests that the chart management was in a mess on board. The official Navigation
Order of setting up the prohibited navigational water area was issued in 2007, and its
chart information was subsequently broadcasted via the Coastal Radio System as
well as published in the latest Notice to Mariner. In the light of its implemented
documents of the SMS, the second mate is specifically responsible for the chart
management, while the master, at the top management level on board, has the overall
responsibility of such management. Until the accident happened, no information,
even with the projection of bridge construction which was initiated in 2005, was
marked on the concerned chart in terms of chart small correction.
The mentioned mess corporation between the shipowner and shipping company fully
reflects the insufficient and inconsistent support of the implementation of ISM Code,
by the shipowner, who discouraged the shipping company to exercise its obligations
to monitor the vessel’s performance. In the first quarter of 2008 prior to the accident,
the vessel was not boarded and inspected by the shipping company. In accordance
with its ISM documents, certain inspections by the shipping company should have
been exercised on board at a given interval.
More surprisingly, even in the company’s safety operation room, the chart used in
this voyage which should have contained the bridge construction information was not
maintained at the updated level either. It was equipped with a live voyage tracking
system with a non-updated digital chart, but no warning information was being sent
to its vessel prior to the collision. It conveys an explicit message that the chart small
correction was not a compelling concern from the company’s perspective.
During the flag state inspection on board in November 2007, the competent authority
issued a report concerning such deficiencies, but with a disappointed consequence
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that no one really took care of this issue in their hearts. Thereby, whoever at the
proximal or remote side, both sides maintained the safety operation with regard to
chart management at an improper level, ultimately leading to the occurrence of the
collision.
In addition, the qualification of the master should be doubted in terms of sufficient
proficiency to exercise his job. The inquiry record of the shipping company signaled
that another master recommended by the shipowner failed to pass the examination by
the shipping company a couple of months earlier. Neither the process of employment
of the new master involved in this accident, together with two other ordinary crew
members, nor its interview and examination according to its SMS documentation,
was conducted by or even notified to the shipping company. The non-involvement of
the crew employment of the shipping company with regard to the requirement of the
ISM Code constitutes the evidence of non-conformity at its organizational level. It
has been widely agreed that a competent master should have been aware of the
elementary role of the updated chart in safety navigation on board. The new master
in question failed to emphasize but succeeded in proving the importance of the role
of the updated chart by showing his experience.
Furthermore, by its job description, the master was supposed to scrutinize and
approve the planned route that the second mate had made under the direction of his
best professional judgement and credible informative sources. Because of his
competency was in question and insufficient attention on the validity of the chart, the
planned route, as the vessel actually sailed, was believed not to have been scrutinized,
at least in an acceptable manner.
With reference to the preconditions for unsafe acts, no information written on the
official report intimated that there was something wrong on board concerning the
psychologically technical shortage due to the fact that all four of the seafarers
involved died during the accident. It was technically and objectively difficult to
determine what was wrong in this respect.
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Theoretically speaking, an analysis of any collision case should be made by both
sides with a view to diagnosing what failures had taken place on each side. To give a
simple example, if the regulation have been set up to demand one more barrier to be
established, e.g. special navigation monitoring system within the bridge water area,
such an accident could have been prevented from occurring by warning and
informing the crew prior to its collision. However, the adapted HFACS framework
appears to be incapable of dealing with more than one part involved in the same
incident, otherwise being in a mess condition so that the incident developments
involved would not be recognized in a comfortable way.
In summary, the cause of the collision between the QINFENG 128 and the bridge
span appears to be an exceptional violation, transferring through the prohibited
navigational water area, by the scarcity of a valid and updated informative chart due
to the improper safety management at both the ship and onshore levels, and the
inappropriate lookout on board. The entire view of the causation analysis from the
adapted HFACS framework point of view is analyzed and presented in Table 6 as
follows.
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1st Tier

Statutory

influences
External
environment

Resources

Organizational
Influences

Organizational
climate

Organizational
Process

3rd Tier
y International/national standards
y Administration
Implementation/enforcement
y Meteorological factors
y Political/economic factors
y Navigation aids/conditions
y Definition of responsibility, authority and
interrelation of related personnel
y Adequate resource and shore-based support
y Designed persons
y Authority of the master
y Qualification of the master
y Seafarers’ qualification
y Seafarers’ ability to understand the rules
y Training requirements
y Linguistic requirements to seafarers
y Effective communication capability of
personnel
y Statutory maintenance support
y Updated and available documentation
y Statement of company’s policy
y Implementation and maintenance of policy
y Report its responsible company to authority
y Definition of responsibility, authority and
interrelation of related personnel
y Designated persons
y Responsibility of the master
y Authority of the master
y Qualification of the master
y Seafarers’ qualification
y Process of the new assignments
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QINFENG 128 case causation

★Constructing bridge barrier cross on
the voyage.
★Failure to manage the employment of
master in a proper procedure.

★Insufficient and inconsistent support
from the shipowner to the shipping
company.

★Failure to supervise the ship safety
operation in relation to the chart small

Remote from the ship

Latent Conditions

Social Environment

2nd Tier

Unsafe supervision/
workplace factors

y Training requirements
y Plans for shipboard operations
y Identification of potential threats
y Drill and exercises
y Measures to respond the hazard and
accidents
y Non-conformities and accident report
y Implementation of corrective action
y Statutory maintenance
y Routine inspections
y Procedure to control documentation and
data
y Effective control of documentation
y Company
verification,
review
and
evaluation
y Designated persons
y Responsibility of the master
y Procedure of new assignments

Inadequate
supervision

Planned
appropriate
operations

in

y Training requirements
y Linguistic requirements to seafarers
y Effective communication capability of
personnel
y Plans for shipboard operations
y Identification of potential threats.
y Drill and exercise
y Measures to respond the hazard and
accidents
y Statutory maintenance
y Routine inspections
y Specific actions to the system failures
y Routine maintenance and test
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correction.
★Failure to monitor the ship’s voyage
on board.
Failure to execute its inspection on
board.

★Failure to approve the planned route
in proper manner.
Failure to supervise the chart small
correction from both ship and onshore
side.
★Failure to make a safe planned route.
Failure to manage chart in a proper
way.

Preconditions for unsafe
acts

Failed to correct
known problems

y Measures to respond the hazard and
accidents
y Non-conformities and accident report
y Implementation of corrective action

Supervisory
violations

y Non-conformities and accident report
y Company
verification,
review
evaluation
y Physical
y Technical
y Cognitive factors
y Physiological state

Environment
Condition of crew
members
Personal

Unsafe acts

Crew interaction
Personal readiness
Skill-based errors
Decision and judgment errors
Perceptual errors
Routine
Exceptional

Violation

★ Violation to sail through the
prohibited navigational water areabridge constructed water area.
★ Failure to maintain the proper
lookout on board.

Table 6 An overview of the causation in the case of the QINGFENG 128 by application of the adapted HFACS framework.

Source: Author.
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Proximity to the ship

Active failures

Error

y
y
y
y
y
y
y

and

★ Failure to correct the defects in
connection with the chart small
correction
reported
by
the
Administration Officer.
★Violation to not maintain the chart in
updated level.

3.2.4 Outcomes of the comparison between the official report and further
analysis using the adapted HFACS model
After all, the official accident report is a report with refined material in consideration
of its validity and authenticity which may not be verified in a proper way. In this
respect, without precise first-hand material from the investigation, the accuracy of
the re-analysis result cannot be guaranteed. There may have been a possibility of
deviation from the truth. Nevertheless, these negative elements cannot impair our
findings from the comparison in terms of its manner of application manner because
our focus on the way of how we analyze the accident from the new insight
perspective:
1. Effective organizational implementation and support plays a crucial role in the
improvement of safety performance on board.
2. Organizational factors were in a dynamic state, meaning that they may trigger
the onset of accidents or unexpected incidents under certain conditions.
3. There may have more than one unsafe act involved in one case.
4. If more than one part is involved in the case, oversimplification will appear to
be shakier.
5. In contrast to the official analysis manner, the new manner by application of the
adapted HFACS framework appears much more guided on how to make the
precautions.
6. The new model guided the investigator to lock the reasonable initiating event
and stop event in the course of maritime investigations.
7. With the benefits of classified and structured categories in the framework, it is
conducive to streamline the data collection from the investigation.
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Chapter 4 Verification of the adapted HFACS
Framework

As noted in Chapter 1, one of the primary tasks of this study is to aim at verifying the
feasibility of the adapted HFACS framework applied in specific maritime cases. The
result of this verification during the application in Chapter 3 appears to be positive.
The benefits from the usage of an accident model have justified its validity in the
maritime field. It is a useful tool in determining what we are going to look for and
resolve. This has been concluded in Chapter 3 and will be discussed partly in Chapter
4 that, by means of the adapted HFACS tool, it guides the analysis of accidents into
deeper and more fundamental causal levels - in particular the organizational factors,
which are the most influential elements in the system and heightened in an
outstanding position. In addition, the applied model contributes to make clear how
the organizational factors affect the system’s safety and how much the organizational
factors contribute to system’s safety. By tracing its pathway to the failures of those
factors, eventually the effective and functional measures to prevent the onset of
maritime accidents at certain organizational levels may be developed in a proper way.
So as to decide the validity of such a framework in the maritime industry, besides
what is generally stated above, we still have to look into the details of two aspects, cf.
the three standards stated in Chapter 2, as follows.
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4.1 Comprehensiveness of the data collection of the adapted HFACS
framework
Leveson (2004) once argued that the most effective causation models we need are
supposed to go beyond portioning liability and instead promote investigators to gain
learning from the accidents as much as possible about all the possible factors
involved, including but not limited to those related to organizational structures and
influencing the accident. The need of such effective causation models in the maritime
domain is also argued for in this study.
In Chapter 3, it has been learned that using the adapted HFACS framework can
accommodate and explore a substantial number of contributory factors by the distinct
classification of those factors. 16 sorts of factors in case 1 while 12 factors in case 2,
on the basis of two official reports, were analyzed using the new insight. The
practical application has proved that none of the possible factors disclosed in the
official reports has fallen outside the HFACS classification and framework. Even the
dynamic and unpredicted weather condition as the external factor, in case 1, has been
integrated in that model. In particular, the functions of the organizational factors in
the framework are proved to be apparent due to their origin under the prevailing ISM
Code. However, the factors in the adapted HFACS framework, which were not
presented in Chapter 3, are still in need of more practice and application in the
foreseeable future.
The experience in such applications suggests that the well-sorted and -structured
failure categories in the HFACS framework are applicable in the analysis of
maritime accidents, at least in the discussed instances. With the well-sorted
categories of failures, investigators are capable of placing the pre-analyzed failures in
proper positions within the framework according to their nature. Some benefits may
be gained from such well sorted categories; including the accident analysis report in
more strategically structured form and the more distinct factors explored and
classified by such well-sorting. Later on the statistics and analysis of a group of such
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reports can be well managed because of their uniform structure and factor
classifications. Looking back on the application of the adapted HFACS framework in
cases, it looks as if the organizational factors were heightened in a certain manner.
The around reverse-Pyramid-structure of the adapted HFACS framework per se has
intimated its propensity in the organizational factors, an indication that the
investigators are guided to do something with regard to the organizational factors
under the guidance of the model. If investigators ask themselves more questions
similar to what rationality is behind the preconditions of unsafe acts, the
disappointing situation identified by Schröder, Baldauf and Ghirxi’s work (2009)
where 73% of precondition of unsafe acts accounted for the fire accident in
machinery space in comparison to 30% of unsafe supervision/workplace factors,
could be shunned. Particular similarity of such a model is the argument of
Rasmussen (1997) that the investigators have to consider that as a compelling
accident causation model, it requires emphasis in explaining the factors that shape
human error, rather than focusing on the frontline operator who commits unsafe acts.
In addition, by its classification structure, the adapted tool appears to combat its
comprehensive data involved by ensuring the “consistency, objectivity and
transparency of the data collection and analysis processes” (Reinach & Viale, 2006).
In spite of the fact that more studies and practices are needed to prove its
applicability in maritime accident investigation practice, the adapted HFACS
framework, at least in this study, has illustrated that its taxonomies were capable of
capturing all collected contributory factors available and its propensity of well-sorted
category may enhance maritime investigation and analysis.

4.2 Depth and reliability of analysis using the adapted HFACS
framework
Despite the origin of the adapted HFACS framework - Reason’s model, which is a
sort of epidemiological model argued by Hollnagel (2004), the experience of its
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application implies that the adapted HFACS framework can be viewed as a kind of
system model, as agreed by Reason (2008) in his article. The merits of the
framework in its application, inter alia, its nature of accommodation of all the factors
stated above, the functional interactions between each factor discussed in Chapter 4,
its capability of dealing with environmental disturbances, and its applicability to
maritime cases, can justify the nature of the systemic model, in comparison to all the
features from the example of the systemic model described by Leveson (2004).
The need of the systemic models in the maritime field has also been proved
conclusively to be necessary. The systemic nature of such a model shows its depth,
credibility and comprehensiveness of analysis in maritime accident investigations.
The applied experience has evidenced that, notwithstanding, the depth of its analysis
by the framework would be contingent closely to the extent which the investigatory
information released by the cited official reports. There are two aspects affecting
how much the accident details will disclose: subjectivity and objectivity.
¾Subjectivity refers to the willingness of the investigator to release the
information in avoidance of publicity challenge on his/her result. Rather than
releasing more information which may mislead publicity to doubt its ability of
clarifying its explanatory report, he/her prefers to focus on the responsibility of
frontline operators, a kind of popularity favored by the authority which may
exclude a good deal of trouble.
¾Objectivity could be interpreted as the investigators’ objective impossibility in
obtaining the necessary information, such as the geographic separation between
the shipowner and shipping company often makes the investigators incapable of
accessing information unless the authority is willing to invest a lot in its
investigations. The more information the report discloses, the deeper and more
latent factors in the analysis by the new model could be approached.
Moreover, the application of such an adapted HFACS framework makes good the
advantage of shunning the answer of what is the root cause, which is the best suitable
for analyzing assumed simple linear causation accidents that is not a systemic view
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and needs intensive time and cost investment to clarify (ABS Consulting, 2005;
Hollnagel, 2009, p.105) and has two more limitations in its application as claimed by
Ferjencik (2010), but with a pragmatic focus on producing workable and effective
corrective measures at all levels of organization to prevent the occurrence. In contrast,
it looks like a complete treatment not only resolves the symptoms on the surface but
also eliminates the underlying disease that causes it. The motivation to formulate an
explanation by using this framework is more pragmatic than the root cause, in a
sense that it well addresses the compelling concern of how to prevent the accident
from reoccurring.
More importantly, “various weaknesses” (Wreathall, 2006) suffered from several
currently used techniques of accident analysis can be addressed by the
comprehensive structure of the adapted HFACS framework. Firstly, as discussed in
4.1, the structured data sufficiently captures all the present collected data covering a
variety from technical process to social process. Secondly, the developed framework
greatly focuses on the role of the organizational factors which is discussed in next
chapter, not simply relying on partially recalled knowledge of events by the seafarers
concerned. Thirdly, this framework describing the control of safety by intangible
safety control flow and tangible well-sorted and -organized structure emphasizes the
couplings between each factor, as if there was no connection, which are further
demonstrated in 5.2.
On the other hand, the perfect application of the “stop rule” (Rasmussen, 1988;
Kinnersley & Roelen, 2007; Hollnagel, 2009, p.11) - “keep investigating until a
familiar cause is found to which the cure is known” - in the adapted HFACS
framework rightly reflects the selection of the initiating event and end event in the
structure of the framework itself. Actually, the structured and classified HFACS
framework provides a pragmatic guidance in selection of both an initiating point
traditionally at its sharp end and a stopping point normally at its organizational level
or social environment level in an effort to trace back the event. In the traditional
manner in our cases, the first and final event in the chain of events is often not fixed,
varying from case to case and subject to the investigators’ preference. The
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investigators’ subjectivity in the selection of an initiating and stopping point leads to
a quite diverse analysis outcome from the accident investigation. In addition, it may
be due to the diversified assumptions implied by the causation models that were used,
known

as

What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find

or

WYLFIWYF

principle

(Hollnagel, 2009, p.85). A typical example can be referred to the case of BP’s Texas
City refinery in Hollnagel’s work.
Why is this matter so important for the outcome of the investigation? Two concerns
should be referred to in order to answer such a question: to assign liability for the
accident and to understand how to prevent the reoccurrence. The former is quite
relevant to the administrative investigation, whose main responsibility is perhaps to
portion the blame and penalize the responsible persons. Some criticisms arise in
response to such an approach for its allocation of blame. A typical one is Dekker (as
cited in Ghirxi, 2008) who criticized as the error classification systems which just
shift the blame up to the organizational level rather than blaming the frontline
operators. In respect of the blame culture, it is a fact that the more failures that are
observed at the organizational level, the more corresponding liability will be
assigned on them. However, the question is why we have to stick ourselves in the
domain of the blame culture. If so, the management level will be motivated by such
to invest more resources in building safety; if so, the mere result of investigation is to
blame the people in operation, no matter which approach is considered. Rather than
the former one, it is more meaningful to see the benefits from the second point of
view - to know how to prevent a reoccurrence. The selection of the initiating and
stopping point provides us with a better and more thorough way to systemically
review the entire organization at enough depth, to cover all the possibilities of
workable measures of prevention ranging from the top management to the frontline
operators, from social process to technical process. All the factors which may affect
the stability of the system are possible to accept the systemic assessment.
By looking into the details of its application, the applicability of the adapted HFACS
framework in specific maritime cases is sufficiently reflected in two aspects as
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discussed above. It has been learned that the adapted HFACS framework provides us
with a far more adequate and thorough structure and classifications than actually
needed. In theory, by its established connection with the ISM Code and the
generality of elements in the ISM Code in terms of the organizational factors, its
applicability will be extended positively to other sorts of accidents in maritime
accident investigation practice. On the other hand, its kindred with the Reason’s
model provides the credibility of the adapted HFACS framework while its depth of
analysis by the new framework tightly relies on the thorough review of contributory
factors in the framework, which has been proved to be positive previously. The
conclusion is made, therefore, that the adapted HFACS framework is effective in
maritime accident investigations.
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Chapter 5 Findings and discussions

Since the verification of the adapted HFACS framework has been established in the
previous chapter, the discussion in this chapter on the organizational factors becomes
more convincing and comfortable in terms of its validity. In contrast to the traditional
manner used by the authorities, the obvious issue we can see is that the adapted
HFACS framework provides investigators with a comprehensive view for
remarkably exploring and classifying not only the human factors, but also some other
factors identified in the course of the analysis of accidents, as discussed in Chapter 2.
In analyzing human error in the cases, the organizational factors have been
highlighted by pinpointing the fundamental positions of the organizational factors in
the system and providing insight about why accidents occur. The following section
focuses on discussing some findings in Chapter 3 in relation to the outcomes
compared between the traditional manner and the new insight.

5.1 More functional barriers towards the organizational levels
become available
The new insight, from the HFACS point of view, into the analysis of the causation
provides a brand new view into the causation of an accident, which constitutes how
the accident develops, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. In contrast to the traditional
manner previously applied in the official analysis of the accident, the most
fundamental benefits of the application of the adapted HFACS model are
comprehensive explanations in response to what caused the unsafe acts. The
difference to other views is that the focus is not on the unsafe acts alone, but on a
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variety of factors from the precondition of unsafe acts to the social environment
influence, far away from the sharp end. This positively guides the investigators to
look beyond the actions taken by the frontline operators and into the latent conditions
that provide the opportunity of expression of those actions. Those latent conditions at
the blunt end, in particular the organizational factors, albeit far from the sharp end,
once identified are relevant to prevent the accident occurrence and protect the system
in the form of setting up functional barriers at those levels. As a consequence, it has
been noted that the new insight is conducive to generate lessons learned from the
accidents and strategies for safety management.
By analyzing the two instances in the adapted HFACS model, an increasing quantity
of remote factors other than proximal factors were presented and analyzed in Chapter
3, in spite of the fact that these factors are not direct causes in nature. In the first case,
eight sorts of organizational factors out of nineteen contributory factors were
presented in comparison to one out of six contributory factors by the traditional
manner, while in the second instance, five sorts of organizational factors out of
fourteen in total were illustrated in contrast to nil out of five in the traditional picture,
with a systemic approach to view and understand accidents. A number of
contributory factors explored from its ground make people understand more deeply
on what, how and why accidents happened in a more systemic, distinct and detailed
way. More remote contributory factors, including organizational factors, are unveiled
and analyzed according to the model structure, specifically conducive to research
into human error, based on the extent of how the latent factors affect the actions or
decision-makings of the frontline operators.
In fact, Hollnagel (2004) pointed out that the process of analysis and explanation of
the accident causation could be appreciated as to an approach to understand how one
or more supposed barriers fail in protection of the system or mitigation of
consequence severity. In this respect, the emerging numbers of underlying cause
factors means more choices of functional barriers could be set up so as to protect the
system next time if those companies in the instances are aware of the importance of
the safety barriers highlighted by the model, similar accidents will perhaps occur
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again in the present settings otherwise. In other words, by using this model, the
investment to implement the ISM Code will maximise its financial benefits and cost
savings in the form of a reduced possibility that an accident will take place again.
More importantly, from the safety management point of view, these safety barriers
could be regarded as the safety functions more than barriers themselves, which
constitute the “safety web” (Harms-Ringdahl, 2009, p.362) in the system it protects.
By analysing the safety function in the organization, people are capable of evaluating
how far the safety functions still effectively work.
On the other hand, those failures at the remote end often persist for a long while, but
not being detected until their expressions in the form of accidents come true, perhaps
triggered by the unfortunate frontline operators. They have an incubation period prior
to the outbreak, in comparison to the virus in the animal body posing potential
dangers. In this respect, an accident is not a totally bad issue to an organization, but
generating an opportunity of detecting the remote and potential deficiencies which
may not be detected and identified in the routine course of risk assessment. However,
this opportunity carries with the possibility of property or even life loss. Examples
can be easily found in the above instances in Chapter 3. A typical example is the
failure of correcting the absence of the rubber packings around the edge of the bow
visor although it was denied as the decisive factor of the causal story. As one of the
contributory factors, it could have been corrected if the organizational climates, e.g.
if the priority of safety margin despite time pressure, had worked effectively prior to
departure. It is true that in the company instead of safety awareness, the awareness of
voyage time pressure was emphatic and often recognized at all operational levels
prior to that accident. The correction of the absence of the rubber packings proved
conclusively to be impossible when the solutions to prevent this occurring seemed to
be out of the captain’s reach due to this reason. The pressing concern on barriers to
be set up at the management levels was dysfunctional in terms of the repeatedly
noted time pressure on voyage, with the speculation that the disaster may not take
place by such a deficiency. Moreover, given the risk assessment perspective, the
identification of a potential threat at the first stage had been already noted and
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reported prior to the evolution of the defects in the accident, but failed to evaluate its
severity and stop its further evolution, still in an alive state. Due to the safety climate,
the management level discounted the “ambiguous threat” (Edmondson, Roberto,
Bohmer, Ferlins & Feldman, 2005) rather than making an explicit decision to assume
the presence of such a real threat, and then eradicate the potential threat in its cradle.
The level of management where safety was not deeply engaged in accordance with
the adapted HFACS model application and analysis should be required to be
reviewed overall at intervals in order to build proper barriers at those levels within
the system accordingly.
In brief, it is suggested that more preventive measures in both quantity and quality at
all levels of an organization will be produced when employing this new form of
analysis. In addition, a better understanding over the pathology of an accident,
particularly factors at organizational level, is significant for ensuring the future
preventive work be successful. These results with organizational barriers can be used
in both safety improvements and learning accordingly.

5.2 The significant role of the organizational factors in the maritime
context
As discussed in the first part, the agreement we have reached is that the new insight,
provided by the adapted HFACS model, authorizes us to have a free hand to
diagnose how the accident took place with a deeper and more comprehensive view,
and explores more fundamental contributory factors - in particular organizational
factors, although these factors were seldom revealed by formal investigations
(Schröder, Baldauf & Ghirxi, 2009). This section establishes an overview of how
these factors influence a ship’s safety, namely by recognizing the contribution of
organizational factors associated with the ISM Code to a ship’s safety, by discussing
the final outcomes observed in Chapter 3.
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In fact, a considerable amount of recent research (including Schröder, Baldauf &
Ghirxi, 2009) revealed some reasons why investigators were reluctant to trace the
origin of an accident back to the organizational level. A scarcity of familiarization
with a proper causation model in coping with non-linear development events
becomes one of the identified reasons. Additionally, in the absence of a
comprehensive approach over the analysis of accidents, it is hard to assess the role of
organizational factors in safety performance in the maritime context. Fortunately,
thanks to the creation of the adapted HFACS framework, a comprehensive review on
the contribution of the organizational factors, directive to the effectiveness of the
ISM Code in the organization, can be conducted. From the adapted HFACS
framework point of view, within the spectrum of the model, the relations among each
factor are mostly interdependent. Among them are diverse degree and direction
interactions, an indication of the “safety control flow” (Swedish Rescue Service
Agency, 2000, p57) from a closed loop control perspective, including those factors at
the low and high levels. As to the original Reason’s model, aside from the sequent
influential flow between higher and lower levels and its influence from top to bottom,
Reason (1997, see Figure 3) himself did not specify any clear clues of interactions at
the same level.

Figure 3 Reason’s Model.
Source: Reason (1997).
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Actually, the experience to apply such a framework suggests the interactions be far
more complicated than those described by Reason. The epidemiological property of
the Reason’s model argued by Hollnagel (2004), discussed in Chapter 4, also
supports such evidence of the sophisticated interactions inside Reason’s model. So is
the adapted HFACS framework by its origin. In the adapted HFACS framework, the
failures of organizational factors’ interactions often end up with the unsafe acts
(except some cases where there is no unsafe act involved, such as the first case),
subsequently inducing the accident. In this respect, human error was no longer
regarded as being the symptom of trouble inside the system. If so, the blame should
be placed on the account of the system as well. If not, it is the failure of the system
that creates human error, such as the failure of interaction. To simplify, the
interactions that affect the organizational manner in terms of maritime safety are
generally categorized as two groups: internal interactions and external interactions.
(1) Within the categories of the organizational influences, the sub-factors at the level
of 2nd Tier or even the 3rd Tier directly or indirectly interact with each other
concerning maritime safety. Whether the induced effects are positive or negative
depends on the extent to how one factor is compatible with another. For instance,
organizational climate, which is defined as the collective perception of organization
safety practice at the individual level, affects greatly the process of decision-making
of allocation of resource. In the second case, the lack of an ideal safety climate
within the shipping company led to the inadequacy of implementing the safety
regulation on equipping it with updated charts on board, as well as the proper
procedure of crew employment. In some cases, job designs with critical functions
will be allocated to several positions at the same level, and are based on these
principles so that diverse and independent interactions serve to monitor or verify the
safety performance in a particular function. These factors are in parallel in the system,
often overlapping with diverse interactions. If these interactions are proved to be
incompatible and dysfunctional, it will be a risk ending up with a negative
consequence, with an increasing possibility of an unsafe act at the sharp end
accordingly.
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(2) When it comes to the interactions between organizational factors with other
levels of contributory factors, it becomes far more complicated than the internal
interactions as discussed above. From the top to bottom, the interaction is naturally
transmitted through the levels one by one from the latent failure to the active failure.
However, sometimes, the interaction could be directly transmitted to the unsafe act at
the sharp end rather than through the supervision or workplace level. In spite of the
fact that, e.g. in the first case, when there was no unsafe act, the accident still takes
place, the combination or accumulation of organizational factors directly or
indirectly contributes to the onset of accidents. In other words, the organizational
factors are able to induce the accident in the situation even without initial event
triggering by the unsafe acts. On the other hand, no organization is living outside the
social environments. In determining the contributory factors, those factors at the
environmental level should be taken into account in this regard. This provides us
with an opportunity to review the effectiveness of the legislative systems in the event
of it lagging behind the technological innovation or malfunctioning presently. Yet
the organizational factors still play a decisive role in determining the level of system
safety performance because of their proactive requirements and social responsibility
to the public. In consideration of the new amended requirement of risk assessment in
the ISM Code, the organization is obligatory to be proactive to protect their system
or specifically its ships, no matter there is a proper legislative requirement or
standard or not. In return for the wealth gained socially, the organization shall be in
collaboration to well create a safe society. The unique feature of the ISM Code fully
reflects that the legislative system exhibits a tendency of setting more functional
requirements than descriptive requirements. Another example is Chapter Ⅱ-2 of the
SOLAS Convention concerning fire safety on board.
By judging the model itself, the accident itself, whether triggered unsafe acts or not,
often begins with the negative organizational influence – from the top position in the
model. On the other hand, by its diverse interactions with the dynamic environment
and preventive influences on the human variability, the organization in the
framework functions as a buffer between the human variability and system and
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between the social environment and system, as something that offsets the excessive
variability when there is too much of it or compensates the variability when there is a
scarcity of it (Hollnagel, 2009, p.57). The failures in terms of being functioned as a
buffer at the organizational level become clear, with its negative effect transferring
down through various organizational and departmental pathways to, no matter via
supervision or the workplace or not, where there is no offsetting or compensation of
variability to cope with human variability and its dynamic environment (which is
discussed in the next part). A huge number of such unsafe acts often take place,
however, whereas only a very few of unsafe acts can really trigger the accident
unless they penetrate into the last barrier in the “Swiss Cheese”. Considering the fact
that, on the other hand, the established barriers, which should have been effective,
are impaired by the organizational factors.
In addition, Reason (1997) argues “the higher an individual’s position within the
organization is, the harder it is to proceduralize the job operation”, it will end up with
a wider and more tragic consequence if such an individual fails to achieve his/her
role. In this respect, human variability at the higher management level with fewer
standard barriers or restrictions often brings about more risks to the whole system
than that at the sharp end. On the other hand, will it become debatable to define
whether decision-making at that level is right or not, until the tragic consequences
become visible? The need to analyze organizational factors thereby becomes
straightforwardly urgent in hope that the system with effective barriers at all levels
can be established.
The main contribution of this model helps people to understand and appreciate that
the frontline operators-the seafarers-will possibly be remitted from the instigators of
an accident, subsequently to be as the inheritors, as asserted by Reason (2008). Those
people who should have been protected by the organizational barriers are expected to
be regarded as the victims of failures of organizational factors, but not perpetrators
from the traditional perspective. The meaning of this model, if being applied in
maritime accident investigations practice, will lie in directing the accident analysis
into a deeper and more symbolic level at which the factors contribute more
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substantially than the frontline operator to the accident (Mohaghegh, Kazemi &
Mosleh, 2009). What is more significant is that it may give birth to an innovative
reform to shift the emphasis of investigation from the sharp end to the remote end by
a function of multiple organizational factors in practice. But we are more willing to
see a phenomenon that the organizational managers will be motivated to take more
effective measures to create an ideal workplace where unsafe acts can be least likely
to be committed, in avoidance of being blamed for their absent role.
In short, diversified organizational factors involved in the system directly or
indirectly affect the possibility of occurrence of unsafe acts, eventually leading to
disasters. Therefore, proper consideration should be taken into account at the
organizational level for effectively preventing the similar accident recurrence. The
significant exploration of organizational factors in such a way helps us not only to
better understand how the accident occurred, but also learn more lessons from the
accidents on how to prevent their occurrence.

5.3 The dynamic and uncertain system in nature
Thousands of years ago, the ancient Chinese philosophical text the I Ching (or Book
of Changes) described a philosophical proverb that in brief in Chinese is “Shangbian,
Guizhong, and Qushi”, meaning that the world where we live in always remains in a
state of varying; in order to survive, we therefore need to be in well-preparedness and
respond correspondingly to the proper extent in a justified manner at a appropriate
time. In essence, “Shangbian” rightly unveils one of important properties of the
system safety - dynamics and uncertainty. This is not only due to “the human
variability in the form of timely adjustments, tweakings and adaptations” (Reason,
2008), but also the dynamic and unpredictable environment surrounding the system.
The human variability in the safety system could be evidenced by the unbelievably
malfunctioned action of exchanging a crew in the second instance. The system with
regard to the safe navigation had transiently been maintained at a comparably stable
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level before the new master boarded the vessel, despite some deficiencies or
turbulences residing. Since the former master was familiar with, and often called at
this port by another route, even without updated information on the bridge
construction available on board, the vessel was still able to leave and arrive safely
and as stable as required. For the time, the significant role of updated information on
the bridge construction in terms of past routes was not so prominent due to the fact
that the master’s voyage passage did not come across the water area of constructed
bridge, something like the role of the positive “performance variability” (Hollnagel,
2009, p.96), i.e. “heroic recovery” (Reason, 2008) under the circumstance without
proper charts. Since the arrival of the new master in question brought about a change
of climate on board, such “stochastic resonance” (Hollnagel, 2004) by the human
variability beyond the acceptable limit - the occurrence of the unexpected - the
collision between the vessel and the bridge span. From the systemic point of view,
the human variability regarded as the internal source of uncertainty leads to the
instability of the system. Given that the vessel was manned with a group of qualified
crew, using standard procedures and equipped with updated charts with proper small
corrections, the “stochastic resonance” may be maintained at a certain acceptable
level, without running over the threshold, even in the case of route changing.
Another reason why the system is dynamic is seeing that the varied and
unpredictable circumstances. In the second example described in Chapter 3, when the
vessel’s voyage moved to the current line between Tallinn and Stockholm, the
unexceptional wind and wave condition resulted in an over wave-induced impact
load, the inadequacy of load on the bow visor appearing to be prominent enough to
bring about the failure of the bow visor’s attachment. Such a given situation that the
ESTONIA encountered was unpredictable and out of all human capability in spite of
the weather report that was issued in advance. However, in accordance with the
survey in the official report, the weather conditions in the open area of the Baltic Sea
are apparently rougher than that along the previous line between Turku and
Stockholm. Apparently, the outside environment surrounding the vessel’s operation
varied after the vessel’s transferring. Notwithstanding, the following disaster proves

74

that insufficient countermeasures had been taken in response to the rougher and
longer route condition. In contrast to the second case, there was no unsafe act
triggering the ESTONIA disaster, in the sense that nothing relating to human
wrongdoing apparently occurred. However, this does not matter with the occurrence
of the accident. Instead, the concurrence of an amount of events at diverse levels
within the organization, in particularly under a dynamic and uncertain environment,
induced such a disaster.
Living in such a kind of dynamic and uncertain world, the Book of Changes properly
requires us to respond proactively in order to drag the system with potential risk back
to the stable state at the appropriate time with a proper and sufficient approach. The
requirement of the Book of Changes is what is to be discussed a little further here organizational resilience, a kind of solution for the organization in response to the
dynamic and uncertain system. The eminent safety engineering author Hollnagel
(2006) defines it as “the essence of resilience is the intrinsic ability of an
organization (system) to maintain or regain a dynamically stable state, which allows
it to continue operations after a major mishap and/or in the presence of a continue
stress.” Such a definition is in line with the motto of the Book of Changes, with an
illustration of the necessity of corresponding change and appropriateness of both the
extent and opportunity of that change.
In response to the system’s disturbance caused by human variability and interaction
under uncertain surroundings, correspondingly changing a part of, or the entire
system, is necessary to improve the reliability and quality of the system. From the
perspective of Hollnagel (2009, pp.41-44), the human variability refers to the
satisficing which is explained as a consequence of limited cognitive capacity, while
the dynamic and uncertain environment relates to the sacrificing which is construed
as a consequence of the intractability of the work environment. The key issues here
in response to the satisficing and sacrificing are the extent to how much changes are
needed, what the opportunity of change is, and what the changes should react, so that,
for instance, the legislation can keep pace with the innovation of the techniques. In
the first cases if the industry can work together with the companies or
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administrations involved in response to the numbers of similar incidents properly and
timely, the accident may not end up with such a dramatically tragic outcome. The
degree of the organizational resilience relies on the capacity at each organizational
level in dealing with the “flexible and informal way of working” (McDonald, 2006)
system dynamics. Even in the context of the shuttle program in the USA where there
are enough budgets, well-programmed procedures and well-educated personnel, for
instance, the lack of informal communication channel flow of information was
blamed as one of the organizational deficiencies in the case of the Columbia
(Milliken, Lant & Bridwell-Mitcheel, 2005).
On the other hand, the system itself, when in a safe situation, is not stable in nature at
all - still in dynamic and uncertain property. Seeing that the human “heroic role” in
adjustment of the deviation functions back to normative performance, the system
appears to run peacefully and smoothly, in comparison with the calm sea surface that
an amount of water in dynamic movement is moving inside it. In the second case, the
former master acted as “heroic role” in maintaining the operation of the ship at a
safety level despite the absence of chart small correction and bridge construction
information.
The dynamic and uncertain property of the system makes the importance of the
organizational resilience symbolic in striving to offset the negative effect through
human variability and a dynamic environment. Therefore, being ready to encounter
the unexpected at any time as a “high reliable organization” (Weick & Sutchliffe,
2007) is an obligatory way to pave the road to safety heaven. The legal style of
elements in the ISM Code to be functional rather than descriptive, rightly addresses
such a need for the organizational factors - dynamics.
To sum up, the role of the organizational factors appears to be indispensable in
ensuring the safety performance in the maritime context. In this regard, more
functional

barriers

for

the

purpose

of

minimizing

the

possibility

of

unsafe-acts-induced accidents and the consequences are recommended to be set up at
each level of organization under the direction of the fundamental lessons and
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strategies learned from the maritime accident investigations. Furthermore, the
dynamic property of a system requires organizational resilience in terms of safety
performance, to be ready to respond with the appropriate action in an acceptable
manner at the proper opportunity.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

As noted previously, in comparison to only blaming the frontline operators, it is more
symbolic for us to learn lessons from the accident investigation on how to prevent
similar accidents recurrence. For this purpose, this paper is motivated to seek a
proper accident causation model to identify the roles of the organizational factors in
maritime casualties. A substantial amount of effort was made to adapt the Human
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework with proper
consideration of the specific situation in the maritime industry and elements of the
ISM Code, which predominantly deals with organizational control in safety
performance on board. Then along with two case studies using such a model, the
applicability was verified positively and the roles of the organizational factors in
maritime context are highlighted and discussed. Some observations regarding the
framework applications into maritime cases and recommendations concerning how to
use the framework in the future are made below:

6.1 Conclusions
For the adapted model:
1. The adapted HFACS framework proved to be effective in maritime accident
investigation. By successfully analyzing two case studies, it was observed that it
is positive to collect comprehensive data with the help of the adapted HFACS
framework and provide deep and reliable analysis of the accident. Its special
contribution to the maritime accident investigation is to guide investigators how
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to collect data and proceduralize investigations and the analysis of an accident
with the focus on human and organizational factors.
2. Aside from specialized investigatory authorities, same principles of the adapted
HFACS framework can be applied as well by the shipping industry for the
purpose of reviewing and benchmarking safety performance both on board and
for shore management. In addition to look into maritime accidents
retrospectively for the purpose of diagnose what is wrong inside the
organization, successful experience can also be concluded and exampled by the
means of the adapted HFACS framework from the majority of successful cases
which are more valuable and pervasive than failures to learn.
3. Due to its full integration of the elements of the ISM Code, the adapted HFACS
framework can be specifically utilized as a manual of measuring the safety
performance of the ISM Code on board and for shore-based management. By
providing the whole-view picture on how the elements the ISM Code interact
with safety performance, safety managers are aware of the importance of
implementing the ISM Code with higher possibility. In this regard, the
implementing organizational decision can be well managed by clearly
evaluating possible interactions with those factors in the adapted HFACS
framework.
For the organizational factors in maritime casualties:
1. By the means of such an adapted HFACS, it will be positive to learn lessons
from maritime accidents with a focus on the organizational levels. This is
important because of their significant influence on maintaining maritime safety.
2. Organizational factors by their interactions with those factors mostly at the
lower level, such as the sharp end, are substantially influential on safety
performance on board, even in the situation where there is no unsafe act
involved. The magnification of the influence by the organizational factors is
possible to be made on the sharp end.
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3. Organizational resilience is required to be maintained in response to the human
variability and environmental dynamics in order to sustain stable safety
performance on board. The adapted HFACS framework is, however, not fully
capable of focusing on resilience aspects.

6.2 Recommendations
Based on the considerations above, the following recommendations should be given:
1. Time and resources are suggested to be intensively invested in investigation and
analysis. According to the categories in the framework discussed previously, a
thorough review of the organizational performance requires relevant
information at all levels of organization. In this respect, thoroughness should
not be compromised with efficiency to quickly and off-handily finalize accident
investigations without producing high-value and workable results, cf. ETTO
(Hollnagel, 2009), at least in major accidents. In accordance with the ISM
Code, however, contemporary shipowners are allowed to set aside the
responsibility of management to the shipping companies. This may bring about
difficulties to the flag state administration concerning the geographical
separation of the shipping companies diverse from the flag state. At least, a
complete review of a major accident requires a considerable amount of time and
resources.
2. A major consideration should be made to develop and document proper
procedures or guidance on how to apply the adapted HFACS framework. Each
framework has its limitations. As Svenson (as cited in Katsakiori,
Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 2009) noted “an accident can be explained in
different ways depending on the accident analysis model that is used” due to its
diverse theoretical hypotheses on which the model is based. The WYLFIWYE
principle stated by Hollnagel also implicated that the conclusions of accident
investigations may be guided explicitly or implicitly by the assumptions or
methods that are used in investigations. It is not surprising that a number of
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investigations with differing premises or instructions may lead to diverse
conclusions in practical maritime accident investigations. This means a certain
accident causation model, such as the adapted HFACS framework, has always
limitations, and therefore accident investigators have to be aware of this.
3. Sufficient training of familiarization of the adapted HFACS framework should
be given to investigators. The quality of utilizing such a framework greatly
would be contingent on the degree of the investigators’ comprehension of the
framework. A typical example is the external environmental factors in the
framework. In some cases, the meteorological conditions have a decisive effect
in determining safety performance on board. These cases should not be
off-handly attributed failures to the organizational factors if such organizations
have completed all reasonable measures to prevent those accidents.
Last but not least, the extent of effectiveness of applying the adapted model into
specific accidents relies on the recognized degree of the investigatory agency
concerning the comprehension of human error and profile of the investigatory agency.
The acceptance of the adapted HFACS framework might not positively change the
way in which the maritime industry, commerce and regulatory authorities view the
causation of the accident derived from such a framework unless they properly apply
it. If such a framework is widely applied in the maritime industry, corresponding
accident databases will be in a well-organized and unique format so statistical and
analytical job from these databases by administrations to conclude certain safety
tendencies, or shipping companies to generate certain safety patterns, will make more
practical sense.
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